Trust Me:
Communication and Competition in Psychological Games*

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Abstract
In this paper we study a communication game with and without competition between senders and embed it in the framework of a psychological game where players experience a wide range of emotions such as guilt, lying, and disappointment aversion. We theoretically characterize the set of equilibria that can be sustained in the game with competition and the game without it and test these predictions in a controlled laboratory experiment. Here we induce material payoffs as well as psychological payoffs. Theoretically, an introduction of the psychological payoffs into a communication game is unequivocally beneficial since without them the no-trade equilibrium is the only equilibrium possible. Moreover, the effect of competition on market outcomes in such a communication game is theoretically ambiguous as it depends on which equilibrium subjects choose to play. Empirically, we find that competition is welfare decreasing for both buyers and sellers. This result is driven by an increase in the amount of lying that competing sellers engage in order to attract business from the buyers, who fail to recognize such an effect and tend to believe these messages more than they should.

1 Introduction
Ever since the seminal paper of Crawford and Sobel (1982), economists have devoted a great amount of attention to communication games. In these games there is typically an informed principal who sends a message to a less informed agent who then takes an action after observing the message that determines the payoffs of both people. When the preferences over material payoffs of the agent and the principal differ, the game takes on interesting strategic aspects. In its classic form neither the principal nor the agent has any aversion to lying, nor do they feel guilty when they mislead their partner, and are concerned only with maximizing their material payoffs from the game.

In many real-world communication games, however, there are psychological costs to lying and misleading others. Principals may feel guilty when they send a message that they know will mislead

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an agent and disappoint him or her; additionally, some principals may simply have an aversion to lying and misleading an unsuspecting agent. For example, if I sell you a damaged good by convincing you that it is brand new I may feel guilty for misleading you. Consequently, if I experience a high enough guilt I may decide not to lie. Similarly, I may have an upbringing that has taught me never to lie, and hence I may not do so even if it allows me to increase my material payoffs. When such psychological payoffs exist, an agent after receiving a message, should not only consider what the sender’s preferences over material outcomes are but also his or her attitude towards guilt and/or lies. Put differently one needs to worry not only about the material preferences of the sender (in fact in our model they are known to the receiver) but also about the moral character of the sender. If the receiver knew that the sender is extremely averse to lying and/or guilt driven in addition, then trusting the messages can become considerably easier for him. The problem however is that rarely does the receiver know the moral character of a random principal. As a result, he has to strive to infer the actual type of the sender and the truthfulness of each received message.

The strategic situation we model in this paper is relevant for many different situations. For example, consider a politician (a mayor) trying to convince voters to support a proposition on the ballot which raises taxes to improve subway service in their city that also has a provision for allowing the mayor to use those funds for other transportation needs he prefers (say roads). The voters are largely in favor of building subways but not roads. So in order to get the proposition passed the mayor will have to advocate subways even if he favors roads. If he comes out strongly in favor of subways the populace will have to assess how much of a bold face liar he is or how guilty he would feel if he told them he was in favor of subways, had them vote accordingly, and then used the money for roads. The issue is a matter of trust based on the voters’ assessment of how sincere (averse to lying or averse to misleading voters) the mayor is. Further, if we introduce two politicians to the situation both bidding for the voters’ attentions (“Crooked Hillary” and “Dissembling Donald Trump”) the situation boils down to voters comparing the trustworthiness of the two candidates given their messages to the voters.

The examples above summarize the strategic setup we are interested in this paper. We look at sender-receiver games where subjects have psychological payoffs such that guilt and lying-averse people suffer from their own dishonesty, and further, their payoffs depend on their beliefs about how much others are relying on their messages (psychological games). In addition, we introduce competition between principals, where two principals send messages in an effort to win over the agent. The agent then decides which of the two principals to believe in. In particular, we consider a situation where two sellers (principals) send messages about the quality of their products to the buyer (agent), and the buyer has to decide on buying the product. We provide a model of such a “psychological-communication game,” solve for its equilibria, both in the case of competition and no-competition, and then bring this model to the lab.

More specifically, the psychological-communication game we study without competition involves two players: the seller and the buyer. The seller owns one unit of a product which is either of high or low quality and wants to sell it to the buyer. The buyer is interested in purchasing the high quality product, but not the low quality one. The situation is complicated by the fact that the buyer cannot distinguish the high from the low quality good and has to rely on the messages sent by the seller prior to making a purchase decision. In addition to the material payoffs, both players in the game obtain psychological payoffs as well, depending on their psychological types. Specifically, sellers might suffer from lying when they misrepresent the quality of the good they own, and also feel guilty if they lead the buyers about the quality of their good, while buyers may suffer disappointment when their expectations about the quality of the good are deflated. The game with
competition is very similar to the game without it except that there are two sellers who compete with each other for the right to sell the good. The competition happens via communication, i.e., both sellers send a message to a buyer whose task is to choose one of the sellers based on the received messages.

Theoretically, the introduction of psychological payoffs into a communication game without competition is unambiguously beneficial since without them, the no-trade equilibrium is the only possible equilibrium outcome. However, introducing psychological payoffs into a communication game without competition admits several informative equilibria in which messages are partially informative, and as a result, trade occurs with positive probability. All of these equilibria achieve higher expected welfare for both sides of the market than the no-trade pooling equilibrium. The effect of competition is less clear. While its introduction does not introduce any new equilibria into the market, it may affect which of the partially informative equilibria are selected. This is why we turn to controlled laboratory experiments for evidence on this issue.

In evaluating the results of our experiments we concentrate on the behavior of our buyers and sellers in markets with and without competition, and also look at the impact of the introduction of competition on the performance of these markets. We find that in both games, with and without competition, our aggregate data indicates that subjects do not select a pooling equilibrium, i.e., an equilibrium where sellers’ messages do not reveal any information, and, as a result, no trade occurs. Instead, subjects play as if sellers’ messages transmit information that can be relied upon by buyers. Moreover, in both games, buyer behavior is consistent with that predicted by our most informative equilibrium in which only the sellers with no psychological disutilities lie in the communication stage. Finally, in both games sellers choose their messages strategically, taking into account their psychological costs.

These results however are ancillary to our primary focus on analyzing the impact of competition between sellers in the psychological-communication game. What we find is that the welfare of both sellers and buyers are unambiguously lower in the game with competition than in the game without competition. There are two effects that contribute to this decrease: (1) competition leads to higher levels of lying by sellers, from even those who have the greatest costs of doing so (i.e., those who suffer high lying costs and are highly guilt averse),\(^1\) and (2) buyers fail to adequately adjust their beliefs to this increased level of dissembling, which points out that our buyers do not best-respond to the strategies that sellers play in the game with competition.\(^2\) If anything, the individual strategies of buyers indicate that buyers’ purchasing decisions are consistent with the belief that messages are more informative in the game with competition than without. In other words, buyers strongly believe that truth is more likely to come out in a competitive environment and act according to this belief. As a result, competition encourages buyers to purchase goods more often even though they end up with a low quality product more often and the average payoffs of both buyers and sellers are lower in the presence of competition.

Our paper has an interesting relationship to the extant literature on communication and psychological games.\(^3\) The literature on cheap-talk communication in different types of strategic situations is extensive and is surveyed in Crawford (1998). More recent papers in this literature looked at

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\(^1\)The idea here is that while in equilibrium none of these subjects should lie, the consequences of not being chosen for a sale by the buyer is such that their greed overcomes their natural distaste for lying and aversion to guilt.

\(^2\)Similar results are found by Jin, Luca and Martin (2017) when studying disclosure behavior by sellers in a market. In that market a failure to disclose the quality of one’s product should signal its low quality yet buyers fail to completely adjust for it.

\(^3\)For a comprehensive survey of theoretical results in psychological games as of 2008, and existing experimental evidence see Attanasi and Nagel (2008).
effects of communication in the collective action settings (Goeree and Yariv (2011)), public good
games (Serra-Garcia, van Damme, and Potters (2013) and Oprea, Charness, and Friedman (2015)),
bargaining games (Agranov and Tergiman (2014) and Baranski and Kagel (2015)), coordination
games (Cason, Sheremeta, and Zhang (2012), Brandts and Cooper (2007), Agranov and Schotter
(2012)), and auctions environments (Agranov and Yariv (2017)). However, this paper is one of
the very few papers that models a communication game as a psychological game. The seminal
experimental papers of Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000) and Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) were
only vaguely connected to communication games in the sense that subjects could communicate
promises to each other but no formal equilibrium of the game was solved for. Their experiment
focused on guilt aversion due to false promises, and found that promises, or statements of positive
intent, improve trust, cooperation and efficiency. Gneezy (2005) studies the role of consequences
in determining the level of deception. He finds that people care about both their own gain from
lying and how much harm their lying may cause to the other side. Vanberg (2008) presented an
experiment without an explicit theoretical model of psychological payoffs to distinguish between
psychological motives such as promise induced changes of second order beliefs (where people dislike
letting others down) vs. a preference for promise keeping under communication, and found that
subjects had a preference for promise keeping on its own. See also Gneezy, Kahackaite, and Sobel
(2018) for a theory and experimental evidence concerning lying in the individual decision-making
task.

The two most closely related papers to ours are Goeree and Zhang (2012) and Casella, Kartik,
Sanchez and Turban (2017). Goeree and Zhang (2012) present a game with similar material payoffs
as ours and also introduce competition. They find that competition and communication act as sub-
stitutes. Communication raises efficiency in the absence of competition, but lowers efficiency when
competition is present. Similarly, competition raises efficiency without communication but lowers
it when parties can communicate with each other. The authors briefly discuss some behavioral
explanations that can account for such outcomes including inequality aversion, guilt aversion, lying
aversion, and reciprocity. While our paper shares some of the features of Goeree and Zhang (2012)
with respect to the way we define material payoffs and competition, we take a very different ap-
proach by introducing psychological payoffs and modeling the game as a psychological game which
allows players to exhibit a wide range of emotions (translated into their payoffs) such as aversions
to guilt, lying, and disappointment. We then obtain theoretical results with regard to the effects
of communication on market outcomes and players’ behavior and test these predictions in a lab
experiment where we induce and control the payoffs associated with these emotions. Despite dif-
ferent approaches, Goeree and Zhang (2012) and we, both show that competition tends to decrease
efficiency when introduced in a communication game.

Casella et al. (2017) also introduces competition into a communication game but fails to model
the game as a psychological game. The authors find that the meaning of messages depends on
whether competition is present or not: messages are inflated in the game with competition, while
these inflated messages induce mostly the same actions on the part of players. Our results show
different patterns: as in Casella et al. (2017) we find the shift in the communication strategies
when competition is present, but contrary to Casella et al. (2017) our buyers fail to interpret
messages correctly when competition is present. Instead they tend to believe these messages and
act accordingly.

In this paper we will proceed as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the model of the buyer seller
communication game with psychological payoffs. This serves as the basis for the experiment we
run. In Section 3 we describe our experimental design. In Section 4 we describe subject behavior
in our experiment and the extent to which it aligns with the predictions of our model. Section 5 follows up on the discussions introduced in Section 4 to discuss the impact of competition on the welfare of our Buyer and Seller. Finally, Section 6 offers some conclusions and a discussion.

2 The Model

We study a straightforward communication game between an informed seller and an uniformed buyer. The informed seller wants to sell a good which can either be of high quality or of low quality. The seller sends a message about the quality of the product to the buyer. The seller can send one of the two possible messages: \( m_1 = "The product is really high quality" \) and \( m_0 = "The product is low quality" \). The uninformed buyer does not know the quality of the good, but observes the message sent by the seller. Based on this message the buyer either buys, or not, and receives a payoff that depends on the good’s quality. Despite the simplicity of this description, our game gets complicated by the fact that the seller’s (and buyer’s) payoffs are influenced by psychological payoffs that depend on their feelings of guilt and lying aversion (for sellers) and disappointment (for buyers). Both players know that such emotions exist and must take them into account when evaluating the veracity of the messages he or she sends and receives.

We study this game in two contexts: one, where there is one seller and one buyer, and another, where there are two sellers competing with each other to sell to a single buyer. In the latter case the buyer chooses one of the sellers to purchase from. We will first describe our model in the absence of psychological payoffs, i.e., using only material payoffs, and then introduce both psychological payoffs and competition.

2.1 Material Payoffs

There are two players: the Seller (he) and the Buyer (she). The Seller owns one unit of the product and wants to sell it to the Buyer. The quality of the product is low \( q = q_L \) with probability \( p > \frac{1}{2} \) and high \( q = q_H \) with remaining probability \( 1 - p \). The Seller knows the quality of the product he owns. The Buyer is interested in purchasing the high quality product, but not the low quality product. The situation is complicated by the fact that the Buyer can not distinguish the high from the low quality good and has to rely on the messages sent by the Seller prior to making purchasing decision.

At the outset of the game, Nature determines the quality of the good owned by the Seller based on the distribution specified above. The Seller observes the quality of his good and sends a message to the Buyer in an attempt to convince her to purchase his good. We will focus on the situation in which there are exactly two messages \( m_1 \) and \( m_0 \) (as defined above) and will denote the set of messages by \( M = \{m_0, m_1\} \). After observing the Seller’s message, the Buyer makes a decision whether to buy the product or not, after which the game ends. The material payoffs of players are depicted in Figure 1, where the top payoff at each end node is the Buyer’s payoff and the bottom one is the Seller’s payoff. The dashed line indicates the information set of the Buyer since she does not know the type of the Seller she is dealing with.

As we see, when a good is not sold both the Buyer and the Seller receive a fixed payoff of 5. When a high quality good is sold both receive a payoff of 10. The interesting case arises when a low quality good is sold, since in this case the Seller receives a payoff of 21, while the Buyer receives 0. Since in this case the preferences of the Buyer and Seller are completely misaligned, the potential for lying exists.
Figure 1: Material Payoffs in the Game without Competition

Notes: The top payoff at each node is the Buyer’s material payoff and the bottom one is the Seller’s material payoff.

Absent any psychological payoffs, the game has a unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium (equilibrium hereafter), in which trade does not occur. To see why this is the case, assume by contradiction that there exists an equilibrium, in which after observing message $m_i \in M$ the Buyer purchases the product with a higher probability than after observing a message $m_j \in M$. Such behavior is justified if the Buyer believes that the Seller with a high quality product is more likely to send message $m_i$ than message $m_j$. However, in that case, the Seller with a low quality product will mimic this behavior and will also send message $m_i$. This implies that there can be no equilibrium where one message entails a higher probability of the high quality product than another. Since the messages are uninformative, the Buyer is left with her original prior probability and since the prior likelihood that the product is of high quality is $1 - p < \frac{1}{2}$, it follows that given our material payoffs, the no-trade equilibrium is the only one that exists.

2.2 Psychological Payoffs

The above analysis changes substantially if we introduce psychological payoffs in this game where players are motivated not only by their material payoffs but also by belief-dependent utilities which are determined by the communication strategies used by the Seller and by the players’ first and second-order beliefs about each others’ actions. Following the literature, we focus on several psy-
chological forces, which have been previously identified as the important ones.

Specifically, we assume that the Seller may experience two emotions, guilt and lying-aversion, while the Buyer may experience disappointment. Guilt stems from the fact that a Seller can feel badly if he leads the Buyer on and then double crosses her. So, in our Buyer-Seller game, the Seller may feel guilty if he convinces the Buyer that he has a high quality product although he is peddling off a low quality product. The effect of this negative emotion on Seller payoffs depends, of course, on the beliefs of the players. In contrast, a Seller may experience discomfort from lying whenever he sends a false message. This negative emotion does not depend on how the Buyer interprets the message and whether she relies on it for her purchase decision. The negative effects of lying occurs simply when the Seller knowingly lies. Finally, the Buyer may experience disappointment whenever she relies on the Seller’s false claims of a high quality product and purchases the product.

Formally, define the Seller’s type as a triple \((q, G, L)\), where the first entry is the product quality \(q \in \{q_L, q_H\}\), and the other two are psychological parameters indicating guilt \(G \in \mathbb{G}\) and lying sensitivity \(L \in \mathbb{L}\). The Seller’s type is drawn from a joint distribution \(F(\cdot)\), and the set of Seller’s types is denoted by \(T_{\text{Seller}}\). The Buyer’s type is determined by a single parameter \(\omega \in \Omega\) which captures Buyer’s disappointment sensitivity. This parameter is drawn from the distribution \(H(\cdot)\), and the set of Buyer’s types is denoted by \(T_{\text{Buyer}}\).

The Seller’s strategy is a function that maps Seller’s type into messages, i.e.,

\[ s^S : T_{\text{Seller}} \rightarrow M \]

where \(s^S(q, G, L)\) denotes the message that the Seller with type \((q, G, L)\) sends in the communication stage. The Buyer’s strategy is a function that determines her purchasing probability given her type and the message received from the Seller, i.e.,

\[ s^B : T_{\text{Buyer}} \times M \rightarrow [0, 1] \]

where \(s^B(\omega, m_i)\) stands for the likelihood that the Buyer with type \(\omega\) purchases the product after observing message \(m_i \in M\).

The overall payoffs of players include material payoffs described above, along with the psychological payoffs determined by players’ beliefs and the messages sent by a Seller. We denote by \(b_1^B(m_i)\) the first-order belief of the Buyer that the Seller has high quality product given message \(m_i\), and by \(b_2^S(m_i)\) the second-order belief of the Seller regarding the first-order belief of the Buyer about the likelihood that the Seller has a high quality good given message \(m_i\). Then, the overall payoffs of players in this game are

\[ \Pi_{\text{Buyer}}^S(s^S, s^B, b_1^B) = \Pi_{\text{material}}^{\text{Buyer}} - \omega \cdot \text{Disappointment} \]
\[ \Pi_{\text{Seller}}^S(s^S, s^B, b_2^S) = \Pi_{\text{material}}^{\text{Seller}} - G \cdot \text{Guilt} - L \cdot \text{Lie} \]

To define the extent of disappointment, guilt and lying, we use the fact that there are only two possible messages and they have natural meaning and a simple interpretation. Recall that the two messages are \(m_0 = \text{“The product is low quality”}\) and \(m_1 = \text{“The product is really of high quality”}\).

The lying component of the Seller’s psychological payoff is determined by the difference between the message the Seller sends and the quality of the good he possesses. In other words, lying aversion


\[5\text{Our theoretical analysis can be extended to incorporate larger message spaces, but the analysis becomes more cumbersome without additional insights.} \]

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captures moral objection to lying, i.e., the Seller dislikes lying. In our game lying comes up in two instances: if a Seller with a low quality good sends message \( m_1 \), then he is lying; similarly, if a Seller with a high quality good sends message \( m_0 \), then also he is lying, albeit in a way that is typically detrimental to his own causes. Lying parameter \( L \) determines the cost one pays when saying a lie.\(^6\)

Contrary to lying, guilt depends both on the message sent by a Seller and the players’ interpretations of the message (their beliefs). A Seller may feel guilty for leading on the Buyer (by claiming that he has a high quality product even though he does not) and eventually delivering the low quality product. This will disappoint the Buyer and the amount of guilt that the Seller experiences will depend on how sensitive the Buyer is to such disappointments. Other things equal, the higher the disappointment parameter \( \omega \) of the Buyer, the more guilty the Seller feels when he leads the Buyer on and then sells her the low quality product. Formally, the amount of guilt that the Seller experiences is equal to

\[
(10 \cdot b^2_S(m_1) - 0) \cdot \mathbb{E}[\omega|\text{Buyer with type } \omega \text{ buys the product after receiving } m_1]
\]

where \( 10 \cdot b^2_S(m_1) \) represents the Seller’s belief regarding payoff that the Buyer expects to get when choosing to buy the product after observing \( m_1 \), and 0 represents the Buyer’s actual material payoff when the Seller has the low quality product to deliver after sending \( m_1 \). This amount of guilt enters the utility of the Seller multiplied by the guilt sensitivity parameter \( G \). We will denote the last term \( \mathbb{E}[\omega|\text{Buyer with type } \omega \text{ buys the product after receiving } m_1] \) by \( \mathbb{E}[\omega \mid \text{Buy} \mid m_1] \).

Finally, the Buyer may feel disappointed after believing the Seller’s claim of a high quality product and ending up buying the product which turns out to be of low quality. We define this disappointment to be equal to the difference between the expected and the actual material payoff she receives conditional on observing \( m_1 \), i.e.,

\[
10 \cdot b^1_B(m_1) - 0
\]

This amount enters the utility of the Buyer multiplied by the disappointment sensitivity parameter \( \omega \). Collecting all the terms, we summarize players’ payoffs as follows:

\[
\Pi_{\text{Buyer}}(m_i, \text{Not Buy}) = 5 \quad \text{for } m_i \in \{m_0, m_1\}
\]

\[
\Pi_{\text{Buyer}}(m_i, \text{Buy}) = \begin{cases} 
10 & \text{if } q = q_H \\
-10 \cdot b^1_B(m_i) \cdot \omega & \text{if } q = q_L
\end{cases} \quad \text{for } m_i \in \{m_0, m_1\}
\]

\[
\Pi_{\text{Seller}}(m_i, \text{Not Buy}) = \begin{cases} 
5 - L \cdot 1_{m_i = m_0} & \text{if } q = q_H \\
5 - L \cdot 1_{m_i = m_1} & \text{if } q = q_L
\end{cases}
\]

\[
\Pi_{\text{Seller}}(m_i, \text{Buy}) = \begin{cases} 
10 - L \cdot 1_{m_i = m_0} & \text{if } q = q_H \\
21 - 10G \cdot b^2_S(m_1) \cdot \mathbb{E}[\omega \mid \text{Buy} \mid m_1] \cdot 1_{m_i = m_1} - L \cdot 1_{m_i = m_1} & \text{if } q = q_L
\end{cases}
\]

where \( 1_{m_i = m_1} \) (\( 1_{m_i = m_0} \)) denotes the indicator function that takes the value one if Seller sent message \( m_i = m_1 \) (\( m_i = m_0 \)) and zero otherwise.

\(^6\)In the experiment, we will abstract away from these last masochistic preferences, i.e., the situation in which Seller says \( m_0 \) when he has a high quality product. This simplification does not change the qualitative results we derive here.
Figure 2 incorporates the psychological payoffs described above into the game described earlier in section 2.1. We find in Figure 2 that psychological payoffs appear whenever the Seller lies and misleads the Buyer (Buyer’s payoffs placed on top of Seller’s payoffs). For example, take the payoff pair on the bottom right of the game tree where the Buyer purchases a low quality product after being told it was of high quality. Given the message the Buyer thinks that the good is of high quality with probability $b_B^1(m_1)$. Although the Buyer here expects a payoff of $10 \cdot b_B^1(m_1)$ from purchasing the good, in reality the good is of a low quality and he ends up with a material payoff of 0. Hence, the magnitude of the Buyer’s disappointment is $0 - 10 \cdot b_B^1(m_1)$ and its effect on her psychological payoffs depends on her realized sensitivity $\omega$, leading to a final payoff of $\omega \cdot (0 - 10 \cdot b_B^1(m_1))$. The Seller’s payoff is $21 - (G \cdot 10 \cdot b_S^2(m_1) \cdot \omega) - L$. Here he receives a material payoff of 21 since he managed to peddle off a low quality good by claiming it to be a high quality one. However, since this leads to a disappointment of the Buyer of the amount $(10 \cdot b_B^1(m_1) \cdot \omega)$, he must subtract a corresponding guilt cost of $G \cdot (10 \cdot b_S^2(m_1) \cdot \omega)$ from the 21, in addition to the lying cost, $L$, since he lied.\footnote{Since the Seller does not know the value of the Buyer’s $\omega$, the actual payoff to the seller is $21 - 10 \cdot G \cdot b_S^2(m_1) \cdot \mathbb{E}[\omega]$ when $\text{Buy} | m_1 \cdot 1_{m_1 = m_1} - L \cdot 1_{m_1 = m_1}$ if $q = q_L$ where $1_{m_1 = m_1}$ is an indicator function taking a value of 1 if the Seller sends the $m_1$ message.}

2.3 Equilibrium Analysis of The Game without Competition

Equilibrium consists of specifying a communication strategy for the Seller, $s^S$, indicating the probability distribution over messages for each Seller’s type, a buying strategy for the Buyer, $s^B$, indicating the probability that the Buyer buys the product for each message $(m_0, m_1)$, and the system of beliefs of both the Buyer and the Seller $(b_B^1, b_S^2)$ such that

1. **Buyer’s actions are optimal**

   $$s^{B^*}(\omega, m_i) = \arg \max_{s^B \in [0, 1]} \mathbb{E}^\text{Buyer}(m_i, s^B) \quad \forall (\omega, m_i) \in T^\text{Buyer} \times M$$

2. **Seller’s messages are optimal**:

   $$s^{S^*}(q, G, L) = \arg \max_{m_i \in M} \mathbb{E}^\text{Seller}(m_i, s^{B^*}) \quad \forall (q, G, L) \in T^\text{Seller}$$

3. **Beliefs are correct**:

   $$b_B^1(m_i) = b_S^2(m_i) = \Pr[q = q_H | s^S(q, G, L) = m_i] \quad \forall m_i \in M$$

In words, just like in any psychological game, in equilibrium (a) actions of both players maximize their expected payoffs conditional on beliefs they hold regarding actions of other players, (b) no Seller type wants to mimic another type in terms of communication strategy used, i.e., messages are optimal, and (c) beliefs are ‘correct’, i.e., first-order and second-order beliefs of players coincide with the expected frequency of Buyer choosing to purchase the product conditional on received messages.

In the analysis that follows we will focus on equilibria in which $b_B^1(m_0) = b_S^2(m_0) \leq b_B^1(m_1) = b_S^2(m_1)$. We view this as a natural restriction, which captures the idea that message that states the
**Notes:** The top payoff at each node is the Buyer’s overall payoff, while the bottom one is the Seller’s overall payoff.

A high-quality product, $m_1$, implies a weakly higher belief regarding the product quality than the other message, $m_0$. Also, we often write $s^B(\omega, m_i) = \text{Not Buy}$ instead of $s^B(\omega, m_i) = 0$ and $s^B(\omega, m_i) = \text{Buy}$ instead of $s^B(\omega, m_i) = 1$ when this creates no confusion.

As standard in any cheap talk game, there exists a non-informative babbling equilibrium in our setting, in which messages sent by the Seller convey no information, and, therefore, the Buyer chooses the same action regardless of the message. We refer to this equilibrium as the pooling equilibrium and note that in our setting there exists a unique pooling equilibrium, in which the Buyer never buys the product and secures the payoff of 5 (no-trade equilibrium).

This pooling equilibrium with psychological payoffs coincides with the unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the game with just material payoffs. The pooling equilibrium however, is not the only type of equilibrium that one can sustain in our psychological game. Under some restrictions on the game’s primitives, there exist partially informative equilibria (PIE), in which some
of the information about the product quality is conveyed in the communication stage between the Seller and the Buyer. These equilibria rely on the existence of psychological utilities that prevent some types of low quality Sellers from mimicking messages of the high quality ones.

Specifically, in any PIE, for a given message \( m_i \) and belief \( b^L_B(m_i) \) associated with it, the Buyer will choose to buy the product if and only if

\[
\mathbb{E} \Pi^{Buyer}(m_i, \text{Buy}) \geq \mathbb{E} \Pi^{Buyer}(m_i, \text{Not Buy}) \iff \\
10 \cdot b^1_B(m_i) + (-10 \cdot b^1_B(m_i) \cdot \omega) \cdot (1 - b^1_B(m_i)) \geq 5 \iff \\
\omega \leq \bar{\omega}(m_i) = \frac{2b^1_B(m_i) - 1}{2b^1_B(m_i)(1 - b^1_B(m_i))}
\]

where \( \bar{\omega}(m_i) \) denotes Buyer’s type who is indifferent between purchasing and not purchasing the product after observing message \( m_i \).

Further, Sellers with a high quality product send the \( m_1 \) message irrespective of their psychological type \( (G, L) \), since (a) lying is costly, and (b) \( b^L_B(m_1) \geq b^L_B(m_0) \), which means that more Buyer types will choose to buy the product since \( \partial \bar{\omega}(m_1) / \partial b^L_B(m_1) > 0 \). Thus, message \( m_0 \) necessarily comes from the Seller with a low quality product, which implies that \( b^L_B(m_0) = b^L_S(m_1) = 0 \) and the Buyer does not to purchase the product after observing message implying \( m_0, s^B(\omega, m_0) = \text{Not Buy} \) for any \( \omega \).

The behavior of Sellers with low quality goods depends on the parameters of the game. Those with relatively lower values of guilt and lying sensitivities may lie and announce they have high quality product in the communication stage, while others with higher values of either guilt or lying sensitivities will tell the truth about the product quality.\(^9\) Thus, in any PIE, \( b^L_B(m_1) = b^L_S(m_1) > 0 \). Further, the Seller with low quality product and type \( (G, L) \) prefers to be truthful and send message \( m_0 \) if and only if

\[
\mathbb{E} \Pi^{Seller}(m_0, \text{Not Buy}) \geq \mathbb{E} \Pi^{Seller}(m_1, s^B(m_1)) \iff \\
5 \geq (1 - H[\bar{\omega}(m_1)]) \cdot (5 - L) + H[\bar{\omega}(m_1)] \cdot (21 - 10G \cdot b^L_S(m_1) \cdot \mathbb{E}[\omega | \omega \leq \bar{\omega}(m_1)] - L)
\]

Finally, in equilibrium, beliefs must be correct, i.e.,

\[
b^L_B(m_1) = b^L_S(m_1) = \frac{1 - p}{1 - p + p \cdot \psi}
\]

where \( \psi \) is the proportion of Sellers with a low quality product who send message \( m_1 \) in equilibrium. Note that the necessary condition for existence of PIE is that the proportion of Sellers with a low quality product who lie in equilibrium is not too high. This is required to guarantee that at least some Buyer types, those with low disappointment sensitivity \( (\omega < \bar{\omega}(m_1)) \), purchase the product after observing message \( m_1 \). The critical task for the Buyers after observing an \( m_1 \) message, amounts to estimating the fraction of Sellers who, given the distribution of guilt and lying aversion among them, are reporting truthfully.

\(^9\)If there exists a Seller who owns a low quality product and has psychological type \((0, 0)\), i.e., a Seller with low quality product who is motivated only by material payoffs, then he will necessarily send message \( m_1 \) in any PIE.


2.4 The Game with Competition

We now introduce competition between Sellers in the game discussed in Section 2. Two sellers (Seller 1 and Seller 2) compete for the opportunity to sell the good to the Buyer.

There are three players in this game: the Buyer, Seller 1 and Seller 2. At the outset of the game, nature draws types of players: \( \omega \in \mathcal{T}_{Buyer} \) for the Buyer, \((q_1, G_1, L_1) \in \mathcal{T}_{Seller} \) for Seller 1, and \((q_2, G_2, L_2) \in \mathcal{T}_{Seller} \) for Seller 2. Player types are private information and are drawn independently from the same distributions as in the game without competition. After observing their types and the quality of their goods (each of which has a probability \( p \) to be a low quality product) both Sellers simultaneously submit their messages to the Buyer: \((m_{Seller 1}^i, m_{Seller 2}^i) \in \mathcal{M} \times \mathcal{M} \) where \( \mathcal{M} = \{m_0, m_1\} \). The Buyer observes both messages and chooses one of the Sellers. The chosen Seller and the Buyer receive payoffs specified in the tree game given their strategies. The Seller who was not selected by the Buyer receives zero payoff.

In what follows, we discuss the properties of the equilibria that can be supported in the game with competition in intuitive terms, and refer the reader to the Appendix for a more rigorous discussion. Our analysis focuses on symmetric equilibria, in which both Sellers use the same communication strategy when they are of the same type, and hold the same beliefs.

The *symmetric equilibrium* in this game consists of specifying the communication strategy for the Sellers \( s^S \), indicating the probability distribution over messages for each Seller’s type, the selection function for the Buyer that indicates which Seller is selected by the Buyer based on observed messages, a buying strategy for the Buyer \( s^B \), indicating the probability that the Buyer buys the product for each message \((m_0, m_1)\) received from the selected Seller, and the system of beliefs for both the Buyer and two Sellers \((b^B_1, b^S_2)\) such that (a) the actions of the Buyer are optimal given her beliefs and the communication strategy of the Sellers (both in terms of which Seller she selects to play the tree game with and her actions in the tree game), (b) the communication strategy of the Sellers is optimal given their beliefs and the actions of the Buyer, and, finally, (c) all beliefs are correct.

In general, the game with competition admits the same types of equilibria as the game without competition. Specifically, there always exists a *unique pooling no-trade equilibrium* in which the Buyer treats all messages received from the Sellers as uninformative, randomly selects one of the two Sellers to buy from. In this equilibrium, the selected Seller and the Buyer get payoffs of 5 each, while the unmatched Seller gets a payoff of zero. In addition, one can also support a *partially informative equilibria* (PIE) in our game with competition. In this case the messages are somewhat informative in the sense that Sellers that own low quality products and have high sensitivity to lying and guilt prefer to be truthful and send message \( m_0 \). In any PIE, if the Buyer receives two different messages from the Sellers, then she selects the one who sent message \( m_1 \), and depending on her disappointment sensitivity \( \omega \) and her belief \( b^B_1(m_1) \) she either buys the product or not. If the Buyer receives two \( m_0 \) messages, then she randomly selects one of the Sellers and does not purchase the product. Finally, if the Buyer receives two \( m_1 \) messages, then she selects randomly one of the Sellers and purchases the product from him with some positive probability depending on her disappointment parameter.

The exact set of equilibria in both games (with and without competition) depends on the parameterization of the game. We discuss our chosen parameters in the next section which are also the same parameters we use in our experimental sessions. These parameters were chosen so that both the game with and without competition have the exact same sets of equilibria: a unique pooling equilibrium and two PIEs, which differ in the fraction of low quality Sellers who lie in the communication stage. The choice of these parameters was deliberate as it allows us to investigate
the equilibrium selection process that occurs in the presence and absence of competition, which is the main force determining whether the competition among Sellers is beneficial or detrimental for the Buyers.

While we establish the existence of an equilibrium for our model using the parameters employed in our experiment, in a supplemental appendix we provide general conditions under which, in addition to the always existent uninformative pooling equilibrium, a partially informative equilibrium (PIE) also exists in which the messages sent by our Sellers have some informational content.

2.5 Parameterization

In order to bring our model to the lab we need to set parameters to be used in both the competition and no-competition games. To do this we will need to define a pair of probability distributions regarding types of buyers and sellers. Specifically, we assume that the probability that the product quality is low is $p = 60\%$, which guarantees that, absent of psychological utilities, both games have the unique pooling equilibrium in which the Buyer never purchases the product. The distribution of the Buyer’s disappointment parameter $\omega$ comes from a uniform distribution $H(\omega) = U[0, 1]$. Moreover, conditional on the product quality, there are four equally likely psychological types of Sellers: $(G, L) \in \{(0, 0), (l, 0), (0, g), (l, g)\}$ where $l = 20$ and $g = 6$.\(^{10}\) This reflects the fact that in our experiment some Sellers are motivated by feelings of both guilt and lie aversion, some experience only one of these two emotions, and some do not suffer from any psychological costs at all. These psychological types are uncorrelated with the quality of the product that a Seller owns, and hence represent the Seller’s internal sensitivity to lying and guilt.

For the experiment and for the analysis presented below, we abstract away from penalizing the Sellers who lie and send the message $m_0$ when they have a high quality product. Sending an $m_0$ message when $q = q_H$ is a lie, it is a self destructive one, and one that is a weakly dominated action. In this case, we do not deduct lying cost for Sellers and assume that if $q = q_H$ then $\Pi_{\text{Seller}}(m_0, \text{Buy}) = 10$ and $\Pi_{\text{Seller}}(m_0, \text{Not Buy}) = 5$.

As we alluded to in the previous section, we chose our parameters in such a way that the set of equilibria that can be supported with and without competition are identical in the games. Specifically, in both games, there exists three equilibria:

1. **Pooling equilibrium.** In this equilibrium, the Buyer treats messages from the Seller(s) as uninformative and does not update her prior probability about Seller’s quality regardless of the observed message. That is, after observing either message, the Buyer believes there is 60% chance that she is facing a low quality Seller. In the game with competition, the Buyer randomly selects one Seller. In both games, the Buyer does not purchase the product and collects payoff of 5.

2. **PIE1.** In this equilibrium, Sellers with a low-quality product and with psychological types $(0, 0)$ and $(0, g)$ lie and send message $m_1$ in equilibrium, while the remaining Sellers with low quality products truthfully reveal the quality of their products. In the game with competition, the Buyer selects a Seller with message $m_1$ if she receives two different messages, otherwise she randomly selects one Seller. In this equilibrium if the message of the chosen Seller is $m_1$, then the Buyer believes that there is a 57% chance that this message comes from the high quality Seller and only Buyers with relatively low disappointment sensitivity buy the

\(^{10}\)The discreteness of the psychological types space of the Seller is not a crucial assumption. We use it for simplicity reasons and because it facilitates the comparison between games with and without competition.
product. Specifically, Buyers purchase the good with a probability of 0.51 after receiving an $m_1$ message from the (chosen) Seller. If, however, the chosen Seller’s message is $m_0$, then the Buyer knows for sure that this message is sent by the low quality Seller and, thus, the Buyer does not buy the product. The Buyer’s expected payoff is 5.22 in the game without competition, and 5.29 in the game with competition.

3. PIE2. In this equilibrium, only the low quality Sellers with the psychological type (0, 0), i.e., those who do not suffer from either lying or guilt, lie and send $m_1$ in equilibrium. The remaining types truthfully reveal their product quality. In the game with competition, the Buyer selects a Seller with message $m_1$ if she receives two different messages, otherwise she randomly selects one Seller. If the chosen Seller’s message is $m_1$, then the Buyer believes that there is 73% chance that this message comes from the high quality Seller and this belief is high enough so that even the Buyer with the highest level of disappointment, $\omega = 1$, prefers to buy the product. Therefore, after observing message $m_1$, all Buyer types purchase the product. However, if the chosen Seller’s message is $m_0$, then the Buyer knows for sure that the good is of low quality and thus does not buy the product. The Buyer’s expected payoff is 6.04 in the game without competition, and 6.46 in the game with competition.

The three equilibria listed above are ranked in terms of how much information is transmitted by Sellers in the communication stage. The pooling equilibrium is the one with the least amount of information since messages are not informative and the Buyers’ posterior beliefs about the quality of the Seller after observing either of the two messages is identical to the prior. In PIE1 and PIE2, messages are partially informative as they change the posterior probabilities that Buyers assign to the Sellers’ types. In our setup, PIE2 is the most informative equilibrium one can support since the only psychological type of the low quality Seller who lies in this equilibrium is the type that suffers no psychological disutility from lying and guilt. We will define the notion of the informativeness of an equilibrium as the difference between posterior belief of the Buyer after observing message $m_1$ and message $m_0$ and denote it by $E_{\text{info}}$. That is,

$$E_{\text{info}} = b_B^1(m_1) - b_B^1(m_0)$$

The larger this difference, the more information the Buyer learns from the Seller’s messages. The next observation summarizes the discussion regarding informativeness of different types of equilibria in both versions of the game.

**Observation 1.** The three equilibria discussed above are ranked in terms of their informativeness, with pooling equilibrium being the least informative and PIE2 being the most informative

$$0 = E_{\text{info}}^{\text{POOL}} < E_{\text{info}}^{\text{PIE1}} = 0.57 < E_{\text{info}}^{\text{PIE2}} = 0.73$$

Informativeness of equilibria can directly be translated into expected payoffs of the Buyer. The more information the Buyer receives from the Sellers’ messages, the better purchasing decisions the Buyer can make. This is summarized in the next observation, which again applies to both versions of the game.

**Observation 2.** In both games with and without competition, the expected payoff of the Buyer monotonically increases with the informativeness of the equilibria, i.e.,

$$\mathbb{E}\Pi_{\text{Buyer}}^{\text{POOL}} < \mathbb{E}\Pi_{\text{Buyer}}^{\text{PIE1}} < \mathbb{E}\Pi_{\text{Buyer}}^{\text{PIE2}}$$

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2.6 Effect of Competition on Buyer’s Welfare

As our previous discussion shows, our setup admits multiple equilibria in the game without competition and in the game with competition. Thus, understanding whether competition among the Sellers is beneficial or detrimental to the Buyer is a tricky question. In particular, the answer would depend on which equilibrium is selected in each version of the game since different equilibria result in different expected Buyer’s payoffs. This is ultimately an empirical question, and a compelling reason for conducting laboratory experiments. Controlled, and carefully designed experiments can inform us about equilibrium selection issues, which are extremely hard to disentangle using data collected outside the lab.

When the same equilibrium is played in the two games however, one can compare Buyers’ expected payoffs as we show in the observation below.

**Observation 3:** If the same equilibrium is played in games with and without competition, then the Buyer’s expected payoff is weakly higher in the game with competition.

The logic behind Observation 3 is as follows: when messages are not informative, as is the case in the pooling equilibrium, there is no scope for competition to influence Buyer’s payoffs. The benefit of competition between Sellers comes into play only when messages are partially informative as in the PIE. If the same PIE is played in both games, it means that Sellers’ communication strategies are the same. In this case, the presence of two Sellers increases the likelihood that one of the Sellers receives a high quality good, sends message $m_1$, and is selected by the Buyer. This is beneficial to the Buyer as it increases the chances of the Buyer playing the game with the high quality Seller.

Empirically, however, there are a number of reasons why the buyers’ payoffs will decrease with competition. For example, it is plausible that a Seller might be compelled to lie more often facing competition when he has a bad quality product. If he reveals the quality truthfully, then there is a greater chance that the other Seller will make the sale instead, either because the latter has a high quality good and sends the message $m_1$, or because the latter has a low quality good and still sends message $m_1$ (lies!). Alternatively, it is also possible that the introduction of competition will lead to the selection of different equilibria, some of which have lower Buyer payoffs.

2.7 Predictions

Given our parametrization, the model presented earlier offers distinct point predictions about equilibrium behavior of Buyers and Sellers in our experiment. Because of the multiplicity of equilibria, however, one of our goals in this paper is to try and detect which of these equilibria, if any, were adhered to by our subjects. However, since the proposed model is complex it is prudent to look for qualitative support for our theory in addition to the point predictions. Hence, at various points we examine weaker predictions that make ordinal rather than cardinal predictions.

Probably the easiest equilibrium to detect is the Pooling equilibrium since it makes the starkest predictions. In a Pooling equilibrium, no purchases should be made and Buyers’ beliefs and actions should be the same irrespective of the messages received. This is true because the messages contain no information regarding the quality of the product that the Seller owns. In order for this to be true, however, there must be no correlation between product quality and messages sent by Sellers. This leads to Prediction 1.

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11 Schotter, Weiss and Zapater (1996) have shown that competition can have an impact on rejection behavior in Ultimatum games where Receivers are more willing to accept low offers if the person making such an offer had to compete in a tournament-like setting.
**Prediction 1: Behavior in Pooling equilibrium.** In a Pooling equilibrium, Buyers’ beliefs and actions are the same irrespective of the observed message of the chosen Seller, i.e., \( b_B^1(m_1) = b_B^0(m_0) \) and \( s^B(m_1|\omega) = s^B(m_0|\omega) \). In addition, since all messages are to be ignored, there should be no correlation between messages and product quality for the Sellers.

Our next prediction concerns the way Buyers interpret their received messages by converting them into beliefs about the product’s quality. By looking at these beliefs we hope to gain some insight into the choice of equilibrium by our subjects.

**Prediction 2: Message Interpretation in PIEs.** In our experiment, \( \bar{b}_B^1(m_1) = \{57\%, 73\%\} \) and \( \bar{b}_B^1(m_0) = \{0\%, 0\%\} \), respectively, for our PIE1 and PIE2 equilibria, where \( \bar{b}_B(m_i) \) is the mean Buyer beliefs in the experiment conditional on receiving message \( m_i \in M \).

Prediction 2 provides the point predictions for mean Buyer beliefs for each of the two possible PIEs that might exist. More loosely, conditional on receiving message \( m_1 \), if Buyers’ beliefs are close to 57%, then Buyers’ beliefs adhere to predictions of PIE1, while if these beliefs are closer to 73% then Buyers’ beliefs adhere to predictions of PIE2. In addition to the way in which Buyers interpret messages, our equilibria also provides a precise prediction of Buyers’ purchase decisions conditional on received messages. This leads us to the next two predictions.

**Prediction 3: Buyer Decisions in PIEs.** In our experiment, \( \bar{\omega}(m_1) = \{0.51, 1.00\} \) respectively for PIE1 and PIE2 equilibria, while in both PIEs \( \bar{\omega}(m_0) = 0 \), where \( \bar{\omega}(m_i) \) is the mean sensitivity threshold set by the Buyer conditional on the received message \( m_i \in M \).

Alternatively, evidence for a weaker form of Prediction 3 might only require that Buyers’ cutoffs have the correct ordinal relationship as stated below.

**Prediction 3a: Weak Buyer Decisions in PIEs.** In any partially informative equilibrium, Buyers assign different probabilities to the events that messages \( m_1 \) and \( m_0 \) come from the Seller with a high quality product, i.e., \( b_B^1(m_1) > b_B^0(m_0) \) and act accordingly, i.e., \( s^B(\omega, m_1) \geq s^B(\omega, m_0) \).

**Prediction 4: Sellers’ Behavior in PIEs.** In a PIE1, Sellers with low quality product and psychological types \((0, 0)\) and \((0, G)\) lie and send \( m_1 \), while in a PIE2, the only Seller who lies is the Seller with low quality product and psychological type \((0, 0)\). In either a PIE1 or a PIE2 equilibrium, no Seller lies when endowed with a high quality good.

The weaker version of the last hypothesis suggests that in any PIE there should be a monotonic relationship between messages and psychological types of Sellers conditional on having a low-quality product, while high-quality Sellers should always tell the truth.

**Prediction 4a: Weak Sellers’ Behavior in PIEs.** In any PIE, Sellers with high quality products send message \( m_1 \), while Sellers with low-quality products satisfy

\[
\Pr[s^S(q_L, 0, 0) = m_1] \geq \Pr[s^S(q_L, G, 0) = m_1] \geq \Pr[s^S(q_L, 0, L) = m_1] \geq \Pr[s^S(q_L, G, L) = m_1]
\]

An additional component of our equilibrium concerns the fact that in any equilibrium all first and second order beliefs must be consistent and correct.

**Prediction 5: Belief Confirmation.** In all equilibria,

\[
\bar{b}_B^1(m_i) = \bar{b}_S^2(m_i) = \Pr[q = q_H | s^S(q, G, L) = m_i] \quad \text{for all } m_i \in M
\]
One interesting feature of our model and the associated experiment is the fact that even though the introduction of competition into our communication game does not introduce any new equilibria, and we still have only our Pooling, PIE1 and PIE2, the introduction of competition does have consequences for the welfare of our Buyers and Sellers. This leads us to our next prediction.

**Prediction 6: Buyers’ Welfare and Competition.** In any PIE, the payoffs of the Buyers are higher when there is a competition between Sellers.

Note that Prediction 6 compares the payoffs of Buyers when we hold the equilibrium fixed and introduce competition. However, it is possible that the introduction of competition may lead to a change in the equilibrium selected by the subjects and hence may have an impact on welfare via an equilibrium selection channel. To test for such a change we would need to investigate whether Buyer and or Seller behavior changed when competition was introduced. To simplify our prediction we merely state the following null hypothesis summarized as Prediction 7.

**Prediction 7: Equilibrium Selection and Competition.** There is no difference in the strategies of Buyers and Sellers between the Competition and No Competition treatments in our experiment.

### 3 Experimental Design

The experiment was performed in the experimental lab of the Center for Experimental Social Science (CESS) at New York University. 121 subjects were recruited via E-mail from the general undergraduate population at NYU for an experiment that lasted approximately one hour and forty five minutes. Subjects received a show up fee of $7 and on average received a final payment of $29.5 for their participation. The program used in the experiment was written in Z-Tree (Fischbacher (2007)).

The experiment was a direct implementation of the model described above. Subjects were recruited to the lab in multiples of two or three depending on whether they participated in the No Competition treatment or the Competition treatment respectively. Each experimental session consisted of only one of the two treatments. Once in the lab subjects were randomly assigned to play the role of either a Buyer or a Seller and these roles remained fixed during the entire session. We refer the reader to the Supplementary Appendix for the complete set of instructions in one of the treatments and describe below the main features of the experimental protocol.

In the **No-Competition treatment**, the subjects play the communication game described in Figure 2. Each seller has a product that he wants to sell to the Buyer. There is a 40% chance that the product is of high quality and 60% chance that it is of low quality. Each seller can send a message \( \{m_0, m_1\} \) to his matched buyer to convince her to buy the product. The Seller always knows the quality of his product but the buyer does not. The buyer has to decide whether to buy it or not based on the message she receives.

One innovation of our experiment is that we induce the psychological payoffs described in Figure 2. Consequently we impose costs on the Seller whenever they lie to the Buyer and disappoint the Buyer (guilt). We also impose a sensitivity parameter \( \omega \) on the Buyer that indicates how sensitive she is about being misled by the Seller. Note that in contrast to other experiments where these lying and guilt costs \((L\ and\ G)\) are typically inferred, in our experiment they are induced and take on different values depending on the type of the Seller. In the experiment, the Seller can be one of the four types with equal probability: Type S1 has \((L = 0, G = 0)\), Type S2 has \((L = 0, G = 6)\),
Type S3 has \((L = 20, G = 0)\), and Type S4 has \((L = 20, G = 6)\). Further, the disappointment parameter \(\omega\) is drawn randomly and uniformly over the interval \([0, 1]\) for each Buyer.

In the experiment the Seller’s task is to specify a strategy that is a function of his psychological type and the type of good he is endowed with to the set of messages \(\{m_0, m_1\}\). The Sellers enter their strategies by filling out a table which asks them to specify the messages they want to send conditional on the quality of their goods and their randomly determined types (see Figure 3).

The task of the Buyer is to enter a buying strategy that decides whether she buys the good conditional on the message she receives and her sensitivity type \(\omega\). Buyers do that in the experiment by entering two cutoff values, \(\omega'(m_0)\) for message \(m_0\), and \(\omega'(m_1)\) for message \(m_1\), such that whenever the realized value of \(\omega\) is less than \(\omega'(m_0)\) \((\omega'(m_1))\) the Buyer buys the good \((\) does not buy the good\)). This strategy essentially suggests buying the good as long as the Buyer is not too sensitive to the potential disappointment that stems from being lied to.

In addition to specifying their strategies, subjects were also asked to enter their beliefs. For the Buyer these beliefs were about the quality of the good; in particular, the belief she held as to whether the good was of high quality given the message she received. Hence for each possible message they could receive, they were asked to enter a number between 0 and 100 representing their belief that the good the Seller possessed was of high quality. We elicited the second order beliefs for the Sellers that specified what the Seller thought the first order belief of the Buyer was upon receiving either message \(m_0\) or \(m_1\). The subjects were rewarded for their guesses according to a quadratic scoring rule. In the instructions the subjects were strongly urged to report truthfully since we told them that they would maximize their payoff in the experiment by doing so. We did this because we were not interested what the best belief elicitation rule was and merely wanted

![Figure 3: The interface of Seller’s Task](image)
subjects to report truthfully.

Once these strategies and beliefs were entered they were simulated for 10 periods, and in each period the computer randomly determined the quality of the good and a type for each Seller, and a sensitivity parameter for each Buyer. Further, using the strategies they entered, the computer determined payoffs for them for each of the 10 periods. We call these 10 periods a block and in the experiment we have 10 blocks. After each block the subjects were given time to review their payoffs for the preceding 10 periods before entering their strategies again for the current block that determined their payoffs for the next 10 periods. In each block subjects maintained their roles but were randomly assigned new partners.

We use this block design because entering a strategy and a set of beliefs and reviewing feedback is a time consuming process. Hence it would be very time consuming to have subjects do this for say 50 periods. Our design allows subjects to maximize the amount of feedback they get while economizing on the time they spend mechanically entering their strategies and beliefs. More importantly, we feel this is the correct way to conduct experiments using the strategy method since once a strategy is entered one might as well receive a lot of feedback on it before being asked to change it.\textsuperscript{12} Entering a strategy and receiving only one period of feedback hardly allows a subject to learn very much about it.

To determine a subject’s payoff in the experiment we randomly chose one of the 10 blocks, and in that block paid subjects either for their payoffs in the game or for their elicited beliefs. We did this because in psychological games, payoffs are a function of beliefs and it is very hard to isolate the pure incentive for truthful belief revelation. For example, a Seller can inflate his game payoff by reporting a belief that minimizes the psychological costs included in his game payoffs by appropriately reporting second order beliefs about buyers so as to minimize what they claim to be the expected amount of disappointment they are creating by lying. In other words, by strategically reporting a belief of 0 that the buyers will believe an $m_1$ message, a Seller can eliminate their guilt costs no matter what level his $G$ turns out to be. Paying for either beliefs or game payoffs minimizes or eliminates this incentive. In our Supplementary Appendix we provide some calculations that suggest that given our payoffs, there is very little, if any, advantage to misrepresenting one’s beliefs.

At the end of the session, we administered two risk elicitation tasks using the Gneezy and Potters (1997) methodology. In each of these two tasks, we asked subjects to allocate 100 points (translating into $2\$) between a safe investment, which had a unit return (i.e., returning point for point), and a risky investment, which with probability $p$ returned $R$ points for each point invested and with probability $1-p$ produced no returns for the investment. In the first task, $p = 0.5$ and $R = 2.5$, while in the second task $p = 0.4$ and $R = 3$. One of these two risk tasks was randomly chosen to count for payment and earnings from the risk elicitation task was also added to the earnings from the main task. Conducting two similar tasks with different parameters allows us to reduce measurement errors as shown in Gillen, Snowberg and Yariv (2018).

In the \textbf{Competition treatment}, all procedures were identical except now that we have two Sellers we included a strategy for the Buyer to indicate which Seller to select given the messages from each. Specifically, Buyers were asked to specify the probability with which they would like to be matched with Seller 1 and Seller 2 based on the messages received from each seller. There were four different scenarios that could occur: either both sellers sent message $m_0$, or both sellers sent message $m_1$, or Seller 1 sent $m_0$ and Seller 2 sent $m_1$, or Seller 1 sent $m_1$ and Seller 2 sent $m_0$. For each of these four cases the Buyer needed to specify the probability, a number between 0 and 1.

\textsuperscript{12}A similar method is used by Dal Bo and Frechette (2016) when they study infinitely repeated prisoners’ dilemma games and use the strategy method.
1, that she wants to be matched with Seller 1 (with the remaining probability she was matched with Seller 2). In addition, the Buyer was asked to enter her buying strategy by specifying a cutoff value $\omega'(m_j)$ for each message she received from the selected Seller. Sellers who were not matched were paid zero while those who were matched received payoffs identical to those specified in Figure 2 conditional on their specified strategy and that of the Buyer. We again used the block structure for payoffs here and paid either the game payoffs or the belief payoffs for one full block. In each treatment payoffs were calibrated so that the payoffs received from beliefs were comparable to those from the game.

Our experimental design is summarized in Table 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Treatment</th>
<th>Number of sessions</th>
<th>Number of subjects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No Competition</td>
<td>3 sessions</td>
<td>52 subjects: 26 Buyers and 26 Sellers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competition</td>
<td>4 sessions</td>
<td>69 subjects: 23 Buyers and 46 Sellers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 4 Results

We start this section with a description of our approach to data analysis and the general method we use to perform the statistical tests. Next, we turn our attention to the data by first investigating the predictions outlined above from our model to evaluate how our subjects behaved, and whether they adhered to any of our three equilibria. Our analysis here is guided by the predictions presented in Section 2.7 and focuses on identifying the strategies used by Buyers and Sellers in the presence and absence of competition. To that end we conduct two types of analysis. We analyze the aggregate data collected from Buyers and Sellers in each game. In addition, we focus on the individual subject data to unearth the possibility that different subjects might have played different strategies belonging to different equilibria identified above. This last exercise allows us to recover the distribution of strategies used by Buyers and Sellers in each treatment and learn about equilibria selection in these environments.

Next we turn our attention to the performance of our markets in an attempt to describe the welfare implications of introducing competition among sellers with psychological payoffs.

#### 4.1 Approach to Data Analysis

Given our experimental procedures (described in Section 3), the Buyers and the Sellers state their full strategies and beliefs at the beginning of each block for ten blocks in each treatment. However, these observations are not independent as subjects were re-matched into different groups in each block and interacted with each other. Therefore, throughout this section we will use the regression analysis to compare average outcomes between two groups (be that two treatments or two different types of Sellers). Specifically, we run Random Effects GLS or LOGIT regressions (depending on the nature of the dependent variable) where we regress the variable of interest (for example purchasing decision of Buyers, or the quality of the sold product, or Buyers’ beliefs), on a constant and a dummy variable that indicates one of the considered groups (i.e., two treatments, or two messages), while
clustering observations by sessions to account for potential interdependencies of observations within a session. We say that there is a significant difference between the two considered groups if the estimated coefficient on the dummy variable is significantly different from zero and report p-value associated with it. We use standard classification of significance levels: ** indicates significance at 1% level, * indicates significance at 5% level, and * indicates significance at 10% level.

Finally, most of the analysis presented below focuses on the last 5 blocks of each experimental session. This is done because it is common to observe subjects learning the game by playing it, which is why the data from the first iterations of the game tends to be noisier as subjects are trying to figure out their strategies. By the second part of the experiment subjects have experienced the game many times and may have possibly converged to their preferred strategies. However, we also present subjects’ behavior in the first 5 blocks in several figures and tables to highlight changes in subject behavior due to learning and experience in the game.

4.2 Aggregate Data: Buyers and Sellers Behavior

In this section we compare predicted behavior from our model with the observed Buyer and Seller behavior from our experiment. Our eventual goal is to use these results to understand the performance of our markets and the consequences of such behavior for the welfare of our subjects in the Competition as well as in the No-Competition treatments.

As described above, the model underlying our experiment makes predictions about a wide variety of behavior concerning Buyer and Seller strategies and beliefs. For example, in both treatments we observe the stated beliefs and purchasing cutoffs of Buyers for both messages \( m_0 \) and \( m_1 \). Beliefs for message \( m_i \) indicates the likelihood that this message was sent by a high quality Seller. Cutoff for message \( m_i \), denoted by \( \bar{\omega}(m_i) \), defines the Buyers’ purchasing decisions given her disappointment sensitivity, i.e., types \( \omega \leq \bar{\omega}(m_i) \) will purchase the product after observing \( m_i \), while the remaining types will not. In addition, in the Competition treatment, Buyers reported which Seller they would choose to purchase from conditional on any combination of messages they might receive from the two Sellers. For the Sellers, we observe their communication strategy in each treatment, i.e., message they want to send to the Buyers for each possible combination of product quality they own and their psychological type (lying and guilt parameters), which results in eight possible scenarios. In addition, we observe Sellers’ second-order beliefs regarding the first-order beliefs Buyers hold for each message.

4.2.1 Buyers’ and Sellers’ Behavior Within Treatments

We start with analyzing whether subject behavior in either treatment is consistent with a Pooling equilibrium as proposed in Prediction 1 of Section 2.7. Remember, in a Pooling equilibrium, Buyers treat messages as uninformative, and, therefore, hold the same beliefs and act the same way irrespective of the message they receive. For each treatment, Table 2 presents Buyers’ beliefs and cutoffs conditional on receiving two messages \( m_0 \) and \( m_1 \).

Table 2 finds little support for Pooling equilibrium behavior. For example, column 4 reveals that for the last five blocks in the Competition treatment \( m_0 \) messages lead Buyers to believe that there was a 22% chance that the good being sold was a high-quality good. In contrast, upon receiving \( m_1 \) messages Buyers believed that there was a 77% chance that the good being sold was of high-quality. Similar results hold for the No Competition treatment. In each treatment, statistical tests reject that Buyers interpreted messages \( m_0 \) and \( m_1 \) the same way, and that they acted similarly upon receiving these messages ( \( p < 0.001 \) in all pairwise comparisons in both treatments in the first
5 and in the last 5 blocks). In fact, there is not much difference in actions and beliefs of Buyers between the first and the second half of the experiment with the exception of a rise in beliefs in the No-Competition treatment after observing message $m_1$.

In other words, Buyers did feel that the messages they received had information content and responded to those messages accordingly. This is in contradiction to Prediction 1.

### Table 2: Message Interpretation and Actions of Buyers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>No-Competition</th>
<th></th>
<th>Competition</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>first 5 blocks</td>
<td>last 5 blocks</td>
<td>first 5 blocks</td>
<td>last 5 blocks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buyers’ belief after observing $m_0$</td>
<td>0.24 (0.03)</td>
<td>0.26 (0.06)</td>
<td>0.24 (0.06)</td>
<td>0.22 (0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buyers’ belief after observing $m_1$</td>
<td>0.71 (0.02)</td>
<td>0.76 (0.03)</td>
<td>0.75 (0.04)</td>
<td>0.77 (0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buyers’ cutoff after observing $m_0$</td>
<td>0.31 (0.02)</td>
<td>0.30 (0.03)</td>
<td>0.34 (0.02)</td>
<td>0.31 (0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buyers’ cutoff after observing $m_1$</td>
<td>0.55 (0.04)</td>
<td>0.59 (0.05)</td>
<td>0.56 (0.04)</td>
<td>0.62 (0.04)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Average beliefs and cutoffs of Buyers are reported with robust standard errors in the parenthesis, where observations are clustered at the session level.

We turn next to Sellers’ behavior. Figure 4 presents the average frequencies of $m_1$ messages sent by Sellers of different psychological types in the last 5 blocks of the experiment. The communication strategy of Sellers in the first 5 blocks looks very similar and is presented in the Supplementary Appendix. A Pooling strategy for Sellers would suggest that the messages sent should be independent of the quality of good being sold. If instead, there is any correlation between the quality of the good and the messages sent by the Sellers, then Buyers could obviously use this information and choose a buying strategy that was a best response. Thus, to maintain a Pooling equilibrium all messages must be uninformative and consequently there should be no correlation between the quality of the good and the messages sent. The data presented in Figure 4 confirms that Sellers are not playing a Pooling equilibrium. For example, it is clear that different types of Sellers sent different messages conditional on the quality of the good they had. Overall, across all types and treatments, when a good was of high quality Sellers almost always revealed its true quality, while, when it was of low quality, they often lied. The extent to which they lied depended on their psychological type. Across all Sellers in any treatment, however, it was not the case that messages were not informative.

To substantiate this observation statistically, we ran random effects LOGIT regression for each treatment, where the dependent variable was an indicator variable that takes value 1 if message $m_1$ was sent and zero otherwise, and the independent variables were a constant and a dummy variable representing the quality of the good (coded as 1 for high quality of the good and 0 otherwise). We clustered observations by session as described in Section 4.1. If messages were uninformative, we would expect that the coefficient before the dummy variable would be insignificantly different from zero. Our regressions indicate that we must reject the hypothesis of a lack of correlation between the messages sent and the quality of the good, in favor of a positive relationship between messages and good quality in both treatments and in both parts of the experiment. The estimated coefficient on the product quality dummy is significantly different from zero in all these regressions.

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13Statistical tests confirm: that in the No-Competition treatment $p = 0.661$ ($p = 0.035$) for beliefs after receiving $m_0$ ($m_1$) and $p = 0.680$ ($p = 0.372$) for actions after receiving $m_0$ ($m_1$); in Competition treatment $p = 0.570$ ($p = 0.352$) for beliefs after receiving $m_0$ ($m_1$) and $p = 0.359$ ($p = 0.083$) for actions after receiving $m_0$ ($m_1$).
with $p < 0.001$.

**Figure 4:** Communication Strategy of Sellers (last 5 blocks)

![Graph showing communication strategy of sellers](image)

Notes: Average frequency of sending message $m_1$ is presented for each type of the Seller in each treatment in the second half of the experiment. 95% confidence intervals are computed using robust standard errors obtained by clustering observations by session.

Finally, as explained earlier, there should be no purchases made in a Pooling equilibrium. This is clearly not the case. In fact we find that the good was sold to the Buyer 43% of the time in the last 5 blocks of the No-Competition treatment, and 60% of the time in the last 5 blocks of the Competition treatment. This information is summarized in Figure 6. On the basis of these results we feel confident to reject the idea that subjects, in aggregate, adhered to a Pooling equilibrium in our experiment. We summarize the conclusion of the discussion above in Result 1 below.

**Result 1:** Sellers strategically send messages, and Buyers believe that the messages provide information about the product quality and consequently use different purchasing strategies upon receiving different messages. Such a pattern indicates that Pooling equilibrium is not a good description of aggregate behavior in our experimental data.

Having dispensed with the Pooling equilibrium we now turn our attention towards determining whether the observed behavior can support either of the partially informative equilibria we characterized earlier in Section 2.5. In particular, recall that a PIE1 and a PIE2 differ in the number Sellers with low quality product that lie in the communication stage.

We first focus on Buyers’ beliefs and actions. Predictions 2, 3 and 3a, outlined earlier, specify the beliefs that Buyers should hold after receiving messages $m_1$ and $m_0$ and the corresponding cutoffs Buyers should set. Using the data summarized in Table 2, we reject the null hypothesis that average
beliefs of Buyers after receiving message $m_1$ in the second half of the experiment in both treatments are not significantly different from 0.57 as suggested by PIE1 ($p < 0.001$). We cannot however reject the null that these beliefs are statistically different from 0.73 as suggested by PIE2 ($p = 0.259$ in the No Competition and $p = 0.236$ in the Competition treatments in the last 5 blocks). Thus, our results indicate that Buyers’ beliefs upon receiving message $m_1$ seem to be consistent with PIE2 rather than PIE1 for both the treatments. At the same time, Buyers’ cutoffs determining their purchasing decisions, are lower than those predicted by PIE2 but higher than those predicted by PIE1. In the No Competition treatment, using the data from the last 5 blocks, we reject the hypothesis that $\bar{\omega}(m_1) = 0.51$ and $\bar{\omega}(m_0) = 1$, respectively at significance levels $p = 0.09$ and $p < 0.001$, respectively. In the Competition treatment using the data from the last 5 blocks, we also reject the hypothesis that $\bar{\omega}(m_0) = 0.51$ and $\bar{\omega}(m_0) = 1$ ($p = 0.01$ and $p < 0.001$).

Further, upon receiving message $m_0$ in either a PIE1 or a PIE2, Buyers should set their belief to zero and never buy the good, i.e., $bB(m_0) = 0$, and $\omega(m_0) = 0$. Since these are corner solutions, it means that all the deviations are going to be positive and they will move the average Buyers’ beliefs upon receiving $m_0$ and corresponding cutoffs away from the prediction of zero. Thus, it is not surprising that we reject these predictions. Buyers’ average beliefs in either treatment during the last 5 blocks were 0.26 and 0.22 for the No-Competition and Competition treatments, respectively, which were significantly different from 0 ($p < 0.001$ in both treatments in the last 5 blocks).

The same is true about the purchasing cutoffs that Buyers set upon receiving an $m_0$ message. In the No-Competition treatment the mean of these cutoffs was 0.30 while it was 0.31 in the Competition treatment both of which were significantly different from zero ($p < 0.001$). A perhaps more informative statistic regarding Buyers’ beliefs and cutoffs conditional on receiving message $m_0$ might be a simple descriptive statistic of how often reported beliefs and cutoffs were close to zero allowing for some small noise. In both treatments, in the last 5 blocks of the experiment, the majority of reported beliefs upon observing message $m_0$ are at most 5 percentage points away from zero. This happens in 63% of the time in the No-Competition treatment and in 77% of all cases in the Competition treatment. Similarly, in 61% of all cases Buyers’ cutoffs are at most 5 percentage points away from zero in the last 5 blocks in the No-Competition treatment, while the same number is 74% in the Competition treatment.

There is a simple explanation why our Buyers form beliefs consistent with the PIE2 prediction about the meaning of the message $m_1$ while simultaneously using a lower purchasing cutoff than the one predicted by PIE2. Recall, that our theoretical analysis was performed under the assumption that Buyers are risk-neutral. However, if one would allow Buyers to have concave utilities, i.e., be risk-averse, then we could observe Buyers holding the ‘correct’ beliefs but using lower cutoffs, which is precisely what our data indicates.

To test whether this explanation is supported by our data, we use an additional measure of risk aversion (an investment task), which we collected at the end of each experimental session. In the investment task, subjects were asked to allocate a budget of 200 points between a risk-free asset which paid one point for every point invested and a risky asset which paid 2.5 or 3 points with probability 0.50 or 0.40 for each point invested in the investment task 1 and 2, respectively. Thus, subjects who invest the full amount in the risky asset are either risk-neutral or risk-loving, while lower than full investment indicates that a subject is risk-averse. In addition, we can rank subjects in terms of their risk-attitudes: the lower the amount invested in the risky asset, the more risk-averse she is. Our data indicates that there is a significant correlation between Buyers’ purchasing cutoffs upon observing $m_1$ and their risk-attitudes: Buyers who are more risk-averse set
lower cutoffs for \( m_1 \) (\( p = 0.068 \)).

We now ask how does a Buyer select a Seller in the Competition treatment? There are two distinct scenarios to consider: one in which both Sellers send the same message, and in the other, one Seller sends message \( m_0 \) while another one sends message \( m_1 \). In the first scenario, the Buyer has no basis to prefer one Seller over the other. Our data confirms that. In the last 5 blocks of the experiment, Buyers chose Seller 1 in such situation 53% of the times, but this fraction is not statistically different from 50% (\( p = 0.527 \)). The same is true in the first 5 blocks of the experiment: upon observing identical messages, Buyers choose Seller 1 in 54% of the cases, which is not statistically different from 50% (\( p = 0.233 \)). However, when Buyers got two different messages, in vast majority of cases they chose the Seller with message \( m_1 \) rather than \( m_0 \); this happened in 80% of the cases in the first 5 blocks and in 84% of the cases in the last 5 blocks of the experiment. Both of these fractions are significantly different from 50% (\( p < 0.001 \) in both cases).

**Result 2:** In both treatments, Buyers’ beliefs and cutoffs (conditional on being risk-averse) are consistent with playing PIE2 where only type S1 Sellers with a low quality good lie in the communication stage. In addition, in the Competition treatment, Buyers choose the Seller who sends message \( m_1 \) if two messages are different, while they pick a Seller randomly if both messages are the same.

Turning our attention to Sellers’ communication strategies and Predictions 4 and 4a, we first examine the behavior of Sellers who own a high quality product. In both PIEs and in both treatments, high-quality Sellers should always tell the truth. Figure 4 shows that this prediction is borne out in the vast majority of cases: over 80% of messages sent by high quality Sellers in the second half of the experiment in both treatments are truthful. To perform statistical analysis, we estimate the 95% confidence interval around the observed average likelihood that Sellers with high quality product send message \( m_1 \) and look at whether our theoretical prediction (which says this likelihood should be one) falls into this 95% confidence interval or not. In our No-Competition treatment, the theoretical prediction is contained in the 95% confidence interval for psychological types S3 and S4, but not for the types S1 and S2. In the Competition treatment, the theoretical prediction is contained in the 95% confidence interval for the types S2, S3, and S4 but not for S1.

The situation changes when we look at Sellers with low quality goods. Here the main difference in predicted behavior between PIE1 and PIE2 stems from the number of psychological types of Sellers that lie in the equilibrium. In PIE 1, both types S1 and S2 are expected to lie and send message \( m_1 \), while in PIE2 only type S1 should lie. In the No-Competition treatment we find that about 50% of low quality Sellers with type S1 choose to lie and send message \( m_1 \), while other types (S2, S3, and S4) lie much less which is at least qualitatively consistent with PIE2. In contrast, in the Competition treatment, both types S1 and S2 of the Sellers with low quality products lie the majority of the time (about 80% of types S1 and about 60% of types S2), while types S3 and S4 lie much less. These results do not support either of our PIEs strictly, leading us to reject the hypothesis that either PIE was adhered to (\( p < 0.001 \) in all cases) in terms of Seller strategies. However, since we observe a monotonic decrease in the frequency of sending \( m_1 \) message by low quality Sellers as one moves from type S1 to type S4 in both treatments, Sellers in both treatments display behavior consistent with the weaker version of Prediction 4, namely, Prediction 14.

To reach this conclusion we use the ORIV (Obviously Related Instrumental Variables) technique developed by Gillen, Snowberg and Yariv (2018), which allows to correct for the measurement errors in elicitation of risk attitudes. ORIV is an improved version of traditional instrumental variables approach to errors-in-variables, which produces consistent coefficients, correlations and standard errors and an estimator which is more efficient than standard instrumental variable techniques.
4a. Statistical tests comparing the pairwise frequency of $m_1$ messages across types yield support for Prediction 4a.\textsuperscript{15} What this analysis means is that the vast majority of Sellers with high-quality goods are truthful in their messages in both treatments, while Sellers with low quality goods are strategic in choosing their messages, taking into account the psychological costs of both lying and guilt sensitivity.

**Result 3:** In both games with and without competition, Sellers with high quality goods tend to tell the truth in the communication stage of the experiment, while Sellers with low quality goods but higher values of guilt and lying sensitivity (types 3 and 4) lie less than those with lower values.

### 4.2.2 Buyers’ and Seller’s Behavior Between Treatments

One of the main questions of interest in our experiment is what is the impact of competition on subjects’ behavior and welfare. To this extent, in this section, we evaluate how the introduction of competition changed Buyers’ and Sellers’ beliefs and behavior. The welfare comparisons between treatments are presented in the next section.

Looking first at Buyers’ beliefs and purchasing cutoffs, we see that they are remarkably similar both with and without competition in the last 5 blocks of the experiment (see Table 2). For example, during the last five blocks of the experiment after observing an $m_0$ message the mean belief of Buyers in the No-Competition treatment was 0.26 while it was 0.22 when there was competition. After receiving the $m_1$ message these beliefs were 0.76 and 0.77 respectively. These beliefs are statistically indistinguishable across the two treatments ($p = 0.462$ for message $m_0$ and $p = 0.927$ for message $m_1$). Similarly, we find that Buyers use the same purchasing cutoffs in both treatments. Conditional on receiving an $m_0$ message these cutoffs are 0.30 and 0.31 for the No-Competition and Competition treatment, respectively ($p = 0.627$), while upon receiving the $m_1$ message these cutoffs are 0.59 and 0.62 for the No-Competition and Competition treatments, respectively ($p = 0.558$).

In contrast to Buyers’ behavior, Sellers behave very differently when competition is introduced. Comparing behavior of Sellers between treatments, we observe a systematic difference between amount of lying in the presence and absence of competition. More precisely, Sellers with low quality goods lie significantly more in the Competition than in the No-Competition treatment for all four possible psychological types they may have (see Figure 4). For example, in the no-competition treatment, while Seller types S1, S2, S3, and S4 sent untruthful $m_1$ messages conditional on having a low quality good, 47%, 29%, 4%, and 2% of the time respectively, these percentages increased to 77%, 57%, 28%, and 13%, respectively, when there was competition. Pairwise comparisons between these fractions confirm the directional results evident in Figure 4 ($p = 0.015$ for types S1, $p = 0.006$ for types S2, $p = 0.005$ for types S3, and $p = 0.031$ for types S4).

An alternative way to support this claim is to use stacked regression analysis, in which we analyze messages sent by the Sellers that own low quality products depending on their psychological type and the treatment they belong to (see Table 3). These regressions confirm the pattern documented above. First, Sellers with higher psychological disutilities from guilt and lying tend to lie less in the communication stage in both treatments. Second, there is a substantial increase in the amount of

\textsuperscript{15}Focusing on the Sellers with low quality products, in the last 5 blocks of the No-Competition treatment we observe significant difference between frequency of sending $m_1$ message by types S1 and S2 ($p = 0.006$), and between S2 and S3 types ($p < 0.001$), while there is no significant difference between frequency of sending $m_1$ for types S3 and S4. In the last 5 blocks of the Competition treatment, all pairwise comparisons between frequency of sending message $m_1$ of Sellers with low quality products with different psychological types are statistically significant with $p < 0.001$. 

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lies observed between the two treatments conditional on the psychological type of a Seller: Sellers with low quality products lie more in the Competition than in the No-Competition treatment.

**Table 3**: Messages Sent by Sellers with Low Quality Products

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Seller’s psychological type</th>
<th>first 5 blocks</th>
<th>last 5 blocks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S2</td>
<td>-0.83*** (0.21)</td>
<td>-0.46*** (0.25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S3</td>
<td>-1.61*** (0.26)</td>
<td>-1.29*** (0.41)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S4</td>
<td>-1.92*** (0.38)</td>
<td>-1.78*** (0.51)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator for Competition treatment</td>
<td>1.08*** (0.19)</td>
<td>1.34*** (0.24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.009 (0.22)</td>
<td>-0.36 (0.28)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| # of observations        | 2178           | 2184           |
| # of clusters            | 7              | 7              |
| Log pseudo-likelihood    | -1299.92       | -1294.41       |

Notes: LOGIT regressions with dependent variable equals 1 if the Seller sent message $m_1$ and zero otherwise. Omitted category is the Seller with a low quality product and psychological type S1. Observations are clustered at the session level. *** indicates significance at 1% level, ** indicates significance at 5% level, and * indicates significance at 10% level.

**Result 4**: *There is no statistical difference across our competition and no-competition treatments in terms of Buyers’ beliefs and actions. At the same time, competition leads to a significant increase in the amount of lying that Sellers with low quality products engage in during the communication stage, irrespective of the guilt and lying sensitivity parameters of a Seller.*

As we will see later, Result 4 will have a significant impact on the welfare of Buyers. If Buyers fail to detect that Sellers lie more in the Competition than in the No-Competition treatment, then they are bound to be hurt when competition is introduced.

### 4.2.3 Buyers’ and Sellers’ Beliefs

According to Prediction 5, in any equilibrium, we expect to see that the first-order beliefs of Buyers coincide with the second-order beliefs of Sellers and also coincide with the actual play of subjects for every possible message, which we will denote by $\bar{\tilde{q}}_H(m_i)$ i.e.,

$$\bar{\tilde{b}}_B^{1}\left(m_i\right) = \bar{\tilde{b}}_S^{2}\left(m_i\right) = \Pr \left[q = q_H | s^S(q, g, l) = m_i \right] = \bar{\tilde{q}}_H(m_i) \quad \forall m_i \in M$$

In other words, in equilibrium all beliefs are confirmed. Note however, that while in either of our PIE’s beliefs are expected to be confirmed, the beliefs consistent with each equilibria are different. In the analysis presented below we attempt to investigate whether the beliefs observed in our data are more consistent with one as opposed to another of our PIEs.

We start by comparing beliefs of Buyers and Sellers to those predicted in PIE1 and PIE2. Table 4 reports average beliefs of Buyers and Sellers observed in different treatments as well as the results of statistical tests comparing these beliefs with those predicted by PIE1 and PIE2. The predicted beliefs for PIE1 and PIE2 are listed at the top of the columns corresponding to PIE1.
and PIE2, respectively. As Prediction 2 suggests, we expect in our experiment the mean Buyer beliefs conditional on receiving an \( m_1 \) message to be 57% and 73%, respectively, for a PIE1 and PIE2 equilibrium and \( \bar{b}_B(0) = 0 \) % for each equilibrium when an \( m_0 \) is received.

The results in Table 4 are striking and are dramatically different for PIE1 and PIE2. In every single pairwise comparison, we reject the hypothesis that beliefs of either Sellers or Buyers correspond to the beliefs predicted by PIE1. In contrast, such a hypothesis can not be rejected for PIE2 when the \( m_1 \) messages were sent. For example, over the last five blocks of the experiment the PIE2 equilibrium predicts a mean first order belief of \( \bar{b}_B(1) = 0.73 \) on the part of Buyers when they receive an \( m_1 \) message, and such beliefs were observed to be 0.76 and 0.77 for the No-Competition and Competition treatments respectively. As seen in Table 4 these beliefs are not significantly different from those predicted by PIE2.

PIE2 however fails in organizing our Buyer data when it comes to their responses after observing the \( m_0 \) messages. While theoretically \( \bar{b}_B(m_1) \), and \( \bar{b}_B^2(m_1) \) both should be 0, in our data they are strictly positive for both Buyers and Sellers. This divergence is puzzling: even though Sellers admit owning a low quality product, Buyers choose to ignore their warnings. This too will obviously have welfare consequences.

Table 4: Comparing Buyers’ and Sellers’ Beliefs with PIE1 and PIE2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Data</th>
<th>PIE1: ( b(m_0) = 0, b(m_1) = 0.57 )</th>
<th>PIE2: ( b(m_0) = 0, b(m_1) = 0.73 )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>first 5 blocks</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No-Competition</td>
<td>( \bar{b}_B(m_1) )</td>
<td>( \bar{b}_S^2(m_1) )</td>
<td>( \bar{b}_B^1(m_1) = b(m_1) )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>message ( m_0 )</td>
<td>0.24 (0.03)</td>
<td>0.22 (0.03)</td>
<td>( p &lt; 0.001 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>message ( m_1 )</td>
<td>0.71 (0.02)</td>
<td>0.73 (0.02)</td>
<td>( p &lt; 0.001 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competition</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>message ( m_0 )</td>
<td>0.24 (0.06)</td>
<td>0.25 (0.02)</td>
<td>( p &lt; 0.001 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>message ( m_1 )</td>
<td>0.75 (0.04)</td>
<td>0.68 (0.02)</td>
<td>( p &lt; 0.001 )</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

|               |      |                                        |                                        |
| last 5 blocks |      |                                        |                                        |
| No-Competition | \( \bar{b}_B(m_1) \) | \( \bar{b}_S^2(m_1) \) | \( \bar{b}_B^1(m_1) = b(m_1) \) | \( \bar{b}_S^2(m_1) = b(m_1) \) |
| message \( m_0 \) | 0.26 (0.06) | 0.20 (0.04) | \( p < 0.001 \) | \( p < 0.001 \) |
| message \( m_1 \) | 0.76 (0.03) | 0.73 (0.02) | \( p < 0.001 \) | \( p < 0.001 \) |
| Competition |      |                                        |                                        |
| message \( m_0 \) | 0.22 (0.03) | 0.25 (0.02) | \( p < 0.001 \) | \( p < 0.001 \) |
| message \( m_1 \) | 0.77 (0.03) | 0.70 (0.03) | \( p < 0.001 \) | \( p < 0.001 \) |

Notes: This table reports average observed beliefs of Buyers and Sellers for each possible message in the first two columns, with robust standard errors reported in the parenthesis, where observations are clustered at the session level. The third and the fourth columns report the results of statistical tests comparing Buyers’ and Seller’s beliefs with those predicted by PIE1. The fifth and the sixth columns report the results of statistical tests comparing Buyers’ and Seller’s beliefs with those predicted by PIE2.

Table 5 adds one more piece of information to the beliefs story described above. In addition to listing the beliefs of Buyers and Sellers that were earlier presented in Table 4, Table 5 also depicts the actual probability that message \( m_i \) comes from the high quality Seller, \( \bar{q}_H(m_i) \), and it presents statistical tests comparing Buyers’ and Sellers’ beliefs with each other as well as with

\(^{16}\)We have discussed Buyers’ Beliefs in the previous section, in which we analyzed behavior of Buyers within each treatment. We reproduce some of this information in this table for completeness and ease of exposition.
the actual frequencies observed in the experimental sessions. Focusing on the last 5 blocks of our experimental sessions, we observe a few interesting patterns. First, casual observation of Buyers’ and Sellers’ beliefs suggest that these beliefs are quite similar to each other in both treatments conditional on the observed messages. For example, in the No-Competition treatment over the last 5 blocks, conditional on receiving an \( m_0 \) message the mean belief of Buyers about the probability of the good being high quality was 0.26 while the second order belief of the Seller about that belief was 0.20. For the \( m_1 \) message those beliefs were 0.76 and 0.73 respectively. The results for the Competition treatment were comparable with \( \tilde{b}_B(m_0) = 0.22 \) and \( \tilde{b}_S^2(m_0) = 0.20 \) while \( \tilde{b}_B(m_1) = 0.77 \) and \( \tilde{b}_S^2(m_1) = 0.70 \). Statistical tests confirm that there is no statistical difference between the beliefs conditional on message \( m_1 \) in No-Competition treatment (\( p = 0.136 \)) and message \( m_0 \) in the Competition treatment (\( p = 0.318 \)). There is a statistical difference, however, between Buyers’ and Sellers’ beliefs for \( m_0 \) in the No-Competition treatment and for \( m_1 \) message in the Competition treatment. Despite these statistical differences, however, the average beliefs of the two groups are surprisingly close to each other. This is good news for Sellers, since in the belief task they were rewarded for how close their reported beliefs were from the beliefs stated by Buyers. Buyers, on the other hand, were rewarded for guessing the actual probability that message \( m_i \) comes from a Seller with high quality product, therefore, the relevant statistical test for these are reported in column 5. Except for message \( m_0 \) in the Competition treatment, our Buyers are doing quite poorly as they consistently overestimate the likelihood that message \( m_i \) comes from a Seller who owns a high quality product (compare beliefs in column 1 and column 3). The difference is especially pronounced in Competition treatment for message \( m_1 \) in which average Buyers’ beliefs are almost 30 percentage points above actual ones. For comparison, in the No-Competition treatment, average Buyers’ beliefs for \( m_1 \) are only 5 percentage points above the actual ones.

### Table 5: Buyers’ and Sellers’ Beliefs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>( b_B(m_i) )</th>
<th>( b_S^2(m_i) )</th>
<th>( \tilde{q}_B(m_i) )</th>
<th>( \tilde{b}_S(m_i) = b_S^2(m_i) )</th>
<th>( b_B^2(m_i) = \tilde{q}_B(m_i) )</th>
<th>( b_S^2(m_i) = \tilde{q}_B(m_i) )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>first 5 blocks</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No-Competition</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>message ( m_0 )</td>
<td>0.24 (0.03)</td>
<td>0.22 (0.03)</td>
<td>0.07 (0.04)</td>
<td>( p = 0.218 )</td>
<td>( p &lt; 0.001 )</td>
<td>( p &lt; 0.001 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>message ( m_1 )</td>
<td>0.71 (0.02)</td>
<td>0.73 (0.02)</td>
<td>0.66 (0.03)</td>
<td>( p = 0.561 )</td>
<td>( p &lt; 0.001 )</td>
<td>( p &lt; 0.001 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competition</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>message ( m_0 )</td>
<td>0.24 (0.06)</td>
<td>0.25 (0.02)</td>
<td>0.22 (0.02)</td>
<td>( p = 0.680 )</td>
<td>( p = 0.757 )</td>
<td>( p = 0.052 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>message ( m_1 )</td>
<td>0.75 (0.04)</td>
<td>0.68 (0.02)</td>
<td>0.51 (0.03)</td>
<td>( p = 0.005 )</td>
<td>( p &lt; 0.001 )</td>
<td>( p &lt; 0.001 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>last 5 blocks</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No-Competition</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>message ( m_0 )</td>
<td>0.26 (0.06)</td>
<td>0.20 (0.04)</td>
<td>0.08 (0.04)</td>
<td>( p = 0.009 )</td>
<td>( p = 0.001 )</td>
<td>( p = 0.002 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>message ( m_1 )</td>
<td>0.76 (0.03)</td>
<td>0.73 (0.02)</td>
<td>0.71 (0.02)</td>
<td>( p = 0.136 )</td>
<td>( p = 0.067 )</td>
<td>( p = 0.247 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competition</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>message ( m_0 )</td>
<td>0.22 (0.03)</td>
<td>0.25 (0.02)</td>
<td>0.17 (0.02)</td>
<td>( p = 0.318 )</td>
<td>( p = 0.167 )</td>
<td>( p &lt; 0.001 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>message ( m_1 )</td>
<td>0.77 (0.03)</td>
<td>0.70 (0.03)</td>
<td>0.49 (0.03)</td>
<td>( p = 0.004 )</td>
<td>( p &lt; 0.001 )</td>
<td>( p &lt; 0.001 )</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: This table reports average observed beliefs of Buyers and Sellers for each possible message in the first two columns. The third column reports the observed likelihood that message \( m_i \) comes from the high quality Seller. In all cells in the first three columns we report robust standard errors in the parenthesis, where we cluster observations at the session level. The last three columns report results of statistical tests comparing Buyers’ and Seller’s beliefs (fourth column), Buyers’ beliefs and actual frequencies (fifth column), and Seller’s beliefs and actual frequencies (sixth column).
**Result 5:** PIE2 outperforms PIE1 in organizing our data on first and second order beliefs of Buyers and Sellers. Specifically, we find Buyers’ and Sellers’ beliefs reported for message $m_1$ are statistically indistinguishable from those predicted by PIE2 in both treatments. We do find though that subjects report significantly higher beliefs for message $m_0$ compared to those predicted by PIE2. Sellers’ second-order beliefs also match Buyers’ first-order beliefs quite well, indicating that Sellers understand how Buyers interpret messages. However, Buyers remain somewhat clueless, consistently overestimating the meaning of both messages in both treatments. This effect is especially pronounced in Competition treatment for message $m_1$.

### 4.2.4 Individual-level Data: Buyers’ and Sellers’ Strategies

In this section we look at individual behavior in an attempt to recover the distribution of strategies used by Buyers and Sellers in each treatment. This exercise is informative as it speaks to the equilibrium selection issue we brought up earlier.

A Seller’s strategy consists of specifying eight messages: one for each of the eight psychological type-product quality pairs. In Table 6 we present a breakdown of our Sellers’ strategies in each treatment. We treat strategies reported by Sellers in each block as an independent observation. This allows us to capture learning behavior across blocks, as subjects might change their strategies based on their experiences from previously played blocks.

**Table 6:** Sellers’ Strategies in the Communication Stage

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total # of obs</th>
<th>first 5 blocks</th>
<th>last 5 blocks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No-Comp</td>
<td>Comp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sellers with $q = q_H$ and all psycho types send $m_1$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRUTH and $q = q_L$ with all psycho types send $m_0$</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>89%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIE2 and $q = q_L$ with S1 send $m_1$, others send $m_0$</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIE1 and $q = q_L$ with S1, S2 send $m_1$, others send $m_0$</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POOL and $q = q_L$ with all psycho types send $m_1$</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and remaining observations</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:** In this table we treat a strategy of a Seller in a block as an independent observation.

In all three equilibria, Sellers who own high quality products are expected to send truthful message $m_1$. Further, depending on the behavior of Sellers with low quality products, we can attribute these strategies to one of the considered equilibria, or to non-equilibrium behavior. Table 6 shows that most of the observations can be classified into three types of behavior: TRUTH (Sellers revealing the quality of their product truthfully, which is not part of any equilibrium strategy), PIE1 or PIE2. These three strategies emerge as the most commonly played strategies right from the start of the experiment and remain so till the end of the experiment. However, we find important difference in behavior between the two treatments especially after subjects had gained some experience with the game. In the last 5 blocks of the No-Competition treatment, the most common strategy used by the Sellers is TRUTH, i.e. the one in which messages truthfully reflect the qualities of the products owned by the Sellers. Such a strategy is observed in 50% of the cases in which Sellers with high quality products send message $m_1$. The fraction of Sellers telling the truth
is significantly lower in the Competition treatment (only 21%). The most commonly used strategy in the Competition treatment is the PIE1 equilibrium strategy, in which Sellers with low quality products and psychological types of S1 and S2 lie and send an \( m_1 \) message, while the remaining types of Sellers with low quality products send an \( m_0 \) message. There is also a significant fraction of Sellers in both treatments who play the PIE2 equilibrium (17% in the No-Competition and 13% in the Competition treatment) in the last 5 blocks of the experiment. These results are consistent with the aggregate behavior of Sellers analyzed above, i.e., Sellers with low quality products lie much more in the Competition treatment than in the No-Competition treatment.

To classify Buyers’ strategies, we use Buyers’ cutoffs reported in each block of the experiment, and instead of the point predictions we use the qualitative features of different equilibria described in Section 2.5. We start by classifying Buyers’ strategies into those that play Pooling equilibrium and those that play partially informative equilibria (the first two rows in Table 7). Buyers who set very similar cutoffs for both \( m_1 \) and \( m_0 \) messages, i.e., cutoffs that are less than 10 percentage points apart, are characterized as playing a Pooling strategy since they essentially behave the same way irrespective of the received message. On the contrary, Buyers who set cutoff for an \( m_1 \) message at least 10 percentage points higher than cutoff for an \( m_0 \) message are classified as playing a PIE. Distinguishing which PIE a Buyer is playing is a more complicated task, since as we argued in Section 4.2.1, risk attitude might affect purchasing cutoff for an \( m_1 \) message. However, if one adheres to the assumption of risk-neutrality, then we can say that a Buyer plays PIE1 if she sets the cutoff for message \( m_1 \) close to 0.51 (between 0.4 and 0.6 to allow for some small noise), while a Buyer plays PIE2 if she sets the cutoff for message \( m_1 \) close to 1 (above 0.8 to allow for small noise).\(^{17}\)

Our data on Buyer behavior reveals a few interesting patterns. First, Table 7 shows that by the end of the experiment, only about a quarter of Buyers in each treatment play a Pooling strategy. In fact, Buyers in the Competition treatment play this strategy less and less as they experience the game: the fraction of those who play a Pooling strategy decreases from 40% in the first 5 blocks to 26% in the last 5 blocks. Second, in both treatments, we observe quite a lot of heterogeneity in terms of the cutoff that Buyers set after observing an \( m_1 \) message. This might be driven by differences in the risk attitudes of our experimental Buyers. Despite this heterogeneity, the vast majority of these cutoffs are quite high (above 0.6) which is consistent with playing the most informative PIE, i.e., PIE2 and being a risk averse. Third, if one insists on risk neutrality, then Buyers rarely play PIE1 strategy in either of the treatments (less than 15% in both treatments), while they play PIE2 strategy more often in the Competition than in the No-Competition treatment (\( p = 0.057 \)).

In addition, Buyers’ beliefs indicate that they feel that messages are more informative in the Competition than in the No-Competition treatment. This explains why an \( m_1 \) cutoffs are generally higher in the Competition than in the No-Competition treatment. Recall that we have discussed the informativeness of different types of equilibria in Observation 1 (Section 2.5). According to this observation, the informativeness is defined as the difference in beliefs upon observing an \( m_1 \) and an \( m_0 \) messages, and the most informative equilibrium is PIE2, while the least informative one is the Pooling equilibrium. Following this observation, in Figure 5 we plot the cumulative distribution of observed informativeness of messages in each treatment.

The data presented in Figure 5 shows that overall our Buyers in the Competition treatment

\(^{17}\)We focus on the purchasing cutoffs that Buyers report for an \( m_1 \) message, since this is what distinguishes different types of partially informative equilibria. All PIEs predict that purchasing cutoffs, upon observing an \( m_0 \) message should be zero. Despite that, most of our Buyers chose strictly positive purchasing cutoffs upon observing an \( m_0 \) message. This is consistent with the fact that some Sellers with high quality goods chose to send an \( m_0 \) message.
Table 7: Buyers’ Purchasing Strategies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>first 5 blocks</th>
<th>last 5 blocks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No-Comp</td>
<td>Comp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POOL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$</td>
<td>\omega(m_1) - \omega(m_0)</td>
<td>&lt; 0.1$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$</td>
<td>\omega(m_1) \geq \omega(m_0) + 0.1$</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIE1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$0.4 \leq \omega(m_1) &lt; 0.6$</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIE2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$0.6 \leq \omega(m_1) &lt; 0.8$</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: In this table we treat a strategy of a Buyer in a block as an independent observation.

Figure 5: Observed Informativeness of Messages, by treatment

Notes: Observed informativeness measures the difference between a Buyer’s belief upon observing an $m_1$ message and an $m_0$ message, where a belief upon observing message $m_i$ indicates the likelihood that this message $m_i$ comes from a Seller with a high quality product. We treat a pair of beliefs for a Buyer in a given block as an independent observation.

felt that competition between Sellers increases the informativeness of messages. This is true from the start of the experiment. The cumulative distribution of informativeness in the Competition treatment is shifted to the right of the distribution in the No-Competition treatment for the vast majority of our observations in both the first 5 and the last 5 blocks of the experiment. The exception being Buyers who believe that Sellers always tell the truth in their messages (these Buyers report the difference in beliefs being close to 1). These Buyers are mistaken however, since both on the individual and aggregate level, Sellers lie significantly more in the Competition than in the No-Competition treatment, and, even though in the Competition treatment Buyers are able to select one of the Sellers to buy from, the difference in the informativeness of messages in the Competition treatment is significantly smaller than the one in the No-Competition treatment (see Table 5).
4.3 Market Outcomes and Impact of Competition

As we pointed out at the very outset, one of our main interests in this paper is to understand how the introduction of competition affects market outcomes and what are the mechanisms through which our subjects reached these outcomes. Our theoretical results as well as empirical regularities observed in our experimental sessions allow us to do precisely that.

Recall, that as we established at the beginning, the introduction of psychological payoffs is theoretically unequivocally positive since without psychological payoffs the only equilibrium is the no-trade equilibrium. It is only because people are lying averse and feel bad by misleading people that our market outcomes may improve.

In theory, while competition does not introduce any new equilibria, there is still only the same Pooling, PIE1 and PIE2, there are some distinct ways in which competition can affect market performance. First in the Competition treatment, since there are two Sellers as opposed to one, there is a greater chance that at least one of them will be endowed with a high quality good. If Sellers use the same equilibrium communication strategies in both treatments, and Buyers interpret messages the same way in both treatments, then the Competition treatment should deliver higher payoffs for the Buyer than No-Competition treatment because the probability that at least one Seller will have a high quality good and send a strong message \( m_1 \) is higher than with one Seller. Of course this is an equilibrium result. Out of equilibrium Sellers in the Competition treatment may feel compelled to lie more since it is a dominant strategy to send her \( m_1 \) message when receiving a high quality good and as a result those with low quality goods who send truthful \( m_0 \) messages will never be selected. Another reason why competition may lead to higher welfare is because competition may select a better equilibrium (PIE2 rather than PIE1) when there is competition. However, the equilibrium selection story may work in an opposite direction as well: Buyers’ welfare may decrease in the presence of competition if subjects settle on PIE1 or Pooling equilibrium in the Competition treatment as opposed to PIE2 equilibrium selected in the No-Competition treatment. It is then purely an empirical question as to which of these assertions are relevant for our experiment.

The question we ask in this section is how does competition affect the transaction rates and ultimately welfare in our markets? Figure 6 depicts the frequency of Buyers’ purchasing decisions in each treatment as well as the quality of the purchased good.

As Figure 6 shows competition has a significant effect on the purchasing decisions of Buyers, especially in the second half of the experiment (last 5 blocks), which arguably represents the most relevant data as it captures behavior of subjects after they have had the time to learn the game and converge to a stable strategy.

For example, over the last 5 blocks of the No-Competition treatment only 43% of the products available were actually sold, while this percentage increases to 57% when there is a competition between Sellers. Note that this may be true because, as we have seen in Figure 4, competition leads Sellers to offer more \( m_1 \) messages when a low quality good is being sold yet Buyers interpret these messages as being truthful 77% of the time. Such a combination of messages and beliefs are enough to bolster sales. Second, Buyers end up with lower average quality of the product when competition is present which should be obvious if they are lied to more consistently and do not adjust their beliefs accordingly. The statistical tests confirm these observations. In the last 5 blocks of the experiment, competition leads to Buyers purchasing products more often \( (p < 0.01) \) and to a lower average quality of purchased goods \( (\text{significant at the } 10\% \text{ level, } p = 0.098) \).\(^{18}\)

\(^{18}\)These quantities are not statistically significant in the first 5 blocks: \( p = 0.223 \) and \( p = 0.840 \) in two comparisons, respectively.
Figure 6: Aggregate Outcomes, by Treatment

How often the product was sold to the Buyer

How often sold product was high quality

Notes: The left panel depicts purchasing frequency by treatment. The right panel depicts the likelihood that the product was high quality conditional on the product being purchased. Bars indicate 95% confidence intervals using robust standard errors, which are computed by clustering observations by session.

Table 8: Effect of Competition on Payoffs of Buyers and (selected) Sellers in the Tree Game

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Buyers’ Payoffs</th>
<th>Sellers’ Payoffs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>first 5 blocks</td>
<td>last 5 blocks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competition treatment</td>
<td>-0.11 (0.17)</td>
<td>-0.77** (0.19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Block number</td>
<td>-0.06 (0.06)</td>
<td>-0.05 (0.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>4.59** (0.21)</td>
<td>4.98** (0.52)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Random-effects GLS regressions with dependent variable being Buyers’ Payoffs in the tree game in the first two columns and Sellers’ Payoffs in the tree game in the last two columns. In all regressions, we abstract away from the payoffs subjects accumulated for guessing beliefs tasks. Standard errors are clustered at the session level. ** indicates significance at 5% level, while *** indicates significance at 1% level.

Table 8 reports regressions that investigate the effect of competition on Buyers’ and Sellers’ welfares. To make comparison between Sellers’ payoffs in the two treatments valid, we focus on the payoffs of the selected Seller in the Competition treatment, since the non-selected Seller earns a fixed payoff of zero. Also, in these regressions we abstract away from the payoffs subjects accumulated in the belief-guessing task and focus only on the tree game payoffs.
A few interesting patterns emerge from this analysis. Although there are no differences in the average payoffs of Buyers in the first half of the experiment, Buyers earn significantly less in the Competition than in the No-Competition treatment by the end of the experiment (last 5 blocks). In other words, Buyers suffer from the presence of competition. This result contradicts Prediction 6, which states that in any partially informative equilibrium, the payoffs of the Buyers are higher when there is a competition between Sellers. The Sellers experience a similar effect which is pronounced right from the start of the experiment: both in the first half and in the last half, selected Sellers in the Competition treatment earn less than Sellers in the No-Competition treatment. These effects are statistically significant and meaningful in terms of eventual payoffs our experimental subjects earned in the experiment.

It seems that the Sellers in our experiment felt compelled to lie more often in the face of competition. Although our model can accommodate more lying as part of the equilibrium behavior for Seller types 1 and 2, it cannot accommodate such an increase in lying for types 3 and 4 who suffer significantly for lying and misleading buyers. This can easily be seen in Table 9 which presents average payoffs of Sellers and Buyers broken down by their types in each of the treatment. We focus here on the last 5 blocks of the experiment and refer the reader to the Supplementary Appendix for the same statistics regarding the first 5 blocks of the experiment.

**Table 9: Which Types of Buyers and Sellers Suffer the Most from Competition (last 5 blocks)?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>No-Comp</th>
<th>Comp</th>
<th>Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>SELLERS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>low quality product</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>type S1 (G = 0, L = 0)</td>
<td>12.20 (0.84)</td>
<td>14.93 (1.03)</td>
<td>YES** (p = 0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>type S2 (G = 6, L = 0)</td>
<td>8.26 (0.54)</td>
<td>6.67 (0.76)</td>
<td>YES* (p = 0.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>type S3 (G = 0, L = 20)</td>
<td>9.61 (0.65)</td>
<td>0.08 (1.11)</td>
<td>YES*** (p &lt; 0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>type S4 (G = 6, L = 20)</td>
<td>8.07 (1.22)</td>
<td>-0.70 (1.94)</td>
<td>YES*** (p &lt; 0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SELLERS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>high quality product</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>type S1 (G = 0, L = 0)</td>
<td>7.46 (0.28)</td>
<td>7.83 (0.23)</td>
<td>NO (p = 0.20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>type S2 (G = 6, L = 0)</td>
<td>7.69 (0.26)</td>
<td>8.52 (0.41)</td>
<td>NO (p = 0.15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>type S3 (G = 0, L = 20)</td>
<td>7.90 (0.27)</td>
<td>7.99 (0.23)</td>
<td>NO (p = 0.72)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>type S4 (G = 6, L = 20)</td>
<td>7.56 (0.23)</td>
<td>7.77 (0.26)</td>
<td>NO (p = 0.54)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>BUYERS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ω ≤ 0.2</td>
<td>4.15 (0.33)</td>
<td>4.14 (0.47)</td>
<td>NO (p = 0.96)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.2 &lt; ω ≤ 0.4</td>
<td>4.11 (0.33)</td>
<td>3.37 (0.43)</td>
<td>NO (p = 0.18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.4 &lt; ω ≤ 0.6</td>
<td>4.74 (0.25)</td>
<td>4.08 (0.43)</td>
<td>NO (p = 0.17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.6 &lt; ω ≤ 0.8</td>
<td>4.78 (0.22)</td>
<td>2.97 (0.35)</td>
<td>YES*** (p &lt; 0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ω &gt; 0.8</td>
<td>5.04 (0.13)</td>
<td>4.54 (0.21)</td>
<td>YES** (p = 0.04)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: We report average payoffs of Buyers and Sellers for each type in the last 5 blocks of the experiment and the robust standard error in the parenthesis, where standard errors are clustered at the session level. The last column reports the result of a statistical test comparing payoffs for a fixed type of Buyers or Sellers in the two treatments. The test is performed using Random Effects GLS regressions, in which we regress the payoffs of interest on a constant and a dummy variable indicating one of the treatments, while clustering observations by session. Statistical difference between treatments is assessed by looking at the significance of the estimated dummy coefficient. We use standard convention of * indicating significance at 10% level, ** indicating significance at 5% level, and *** indicating significance at 1% level and report p-value associated with estimated dummy variable in the parenthesis.

As Table 9 shows Sellers who own the high quality product earn the same average payoffs in No-Competition and in Competition treatments irrespective of their psychological type. It is the
Sellers with low quality goods who suffer in the presence of competition, as they earn significantly lower payoffs for all four psychological types. The largest losses are experienced by Sellers with low quality goods and psychological types S3 and S4; those who have strong aversion to lying and might have strong sensitivity to guilt. At the same time, Sellers with low quality goods and high psychological costs, i.e., types S3 and S4, who were selected by Buyers to play the tree game earn average payoffs which are not statistically different from zero, which are exactly the payoffs of the non-chosen Sellers. This indicates that given behavior of other subjects in our experiments, Sellers with low quality goods and types S3 and S4 are not playing dominated actions by sending false message $m_1$ when in fact they own a low quality product. As for the Buyers, it is those with higher disappointment aversion who suffer the most losses from competition between Sellers.

The analysis presented in this section paints a clear picture regarding the effects of competition on market outcomes and welfare of market participants, which we summarize below as Result 6.

Results 6: Competition encourages Buyers to purchase goods more often even though they end up with a low quality product more often. Both Buyers and those Sellers selected to sell earn lower average payoffs in the presence of competition with the largest payoff losses experienced by Sellers with low quality goods and high sensitivity to lying and guilt and by Buyers with high sensitivity to disappointment.

To summarize, our results paint a clear picture of the effects of competition among Sellers. Buyers unequivocally suffer from the presence of competition, as they are more likely to purchase lower quality products. Consequently, they earn lower average payoffs (Result 6). Our previous analysis of Buyers’ and Sellers’ behavior shed light on how these outcomes emerge. Buyers tend to use the same strategies in both treatments, while Sellers with low quality products lie more often in the Competition treatment (Result 4). Moreover, Buyers on average hold correct beliefs about the communication strategies of the Sellers in the No-Competition treatment, while they consistently overestimate how likely message $m_1$ comes from the high quality Seller in the Competition treatment (Result 5). In other words, Buyers fail to discount the meaning of $m_1$ messages in the Competition treatment relative to the No-Competition treatment, although they should have, given that Sellers with low quality products tend to lie more there.

To drive home this point, Figure 7 presents the evolution of the average Buyers’ beliefs (depicted by a line) and actual frequency that message $m_1$ comes from Seller with high quality products (depicted by a bar), block by block in each treatment. In the No-Competition treatment, our Buyers are holding beliefs which are very close to the actual meaning of the $m_1$ message given Sellers’ strategies. However, in the Competition treatment, there is a big gap between what Buyers think message $m_1$ means and what it actually means. In other words, in the Competition treatment Sellers are successfully fooling Buyers by sending message $m_1$ more often when they actually have low quality products.

5 Conclusions

In this paper we studied the impact of competition on the welfare of buyers and sellers in a market where agents have psychological payoffs. More precisely we looked at sellers who suffer a cost both when they lie and/or mislead buyers into buying subpar goods.

In contrast to previous work on psychological games we induced the costs of lies, guilt and disappointment into the payoff functions of our subjects. Doing so allows us to control these psychological payoffs experimentally and evaluate their comparative static effects. Of course one
might suggest that we maybe inducing psychological payoffs where none might otherwise exist, i.e., we make subjects guilt averse or lying averse when they might not be so in real life. This does not do an injustice to our results, however, because either our subjects are more averse to lying and guilt than we make them, in which case our results furnish a lower bound on the impact of such emotions, or they are less averse, in which case we have controlled their emotions precisely. Finally, the aim of our experiment is not to measure people’s lying costs or guilt aversion but to see the impact of those factors on the behavior of our subjects. As we have shown, our experimental design was successful in manipulating the payoffs faced by our subjects and hence achieved our goal.

Our results indicate two broad points about the workings of competitive markets in the presence of psychological payoffs. First, the pressure of competition, especially in a winner-take-all situation, encourages sellers to misrepresent and lie more, even if they suffer from psychological payoffs. This is not true in a situation where sellers do not compete for a buyer with other sellers. This seller propensity to lie more, however, is encouraged by the behavior of our buyers. For example, buyers seem to genuinely believe that competition is necessarily beneficial for their welfare, and consequently trust seller messages more often than in a situation without competition. Strangely enough, even with feedback and experience the buyer naivety does not go away. Consequently, sellers take advantage of such blind faith on the buyers’ part and peddle lower quality products indiscriminately. Furthermore, although sellers with high psychological costs (such as our types 3 and 4) suffer more compared to the sellers in the no competition game with the same types, they are no worse off on an average compared to an unmatched sellers.

As mentioned in our introduction, the implications of our experiment extend beyond simple markets. In particular, it is not uncommon to see politicians lie through their teeth, and keep doing so repeatedly. Citizens’ who exaggerate the ability of political competition to weed out such lies might be at the heart of such continued behavior.
References


