Elections and Strategic Voting: Condorcet and Borda

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Abstract

We show that, among all voting rules, majority rule is uniquely characterized by strategy-proofness, the Pareto principle, anonymity, neutrality, independence of irrelevant alternatives, and decisiveness. Furthermore, there is an extension of majority rule that satisfies these axioms on any preference domain without Condorcet cycles. If independence is dropped, then, for the case of three candidates, the remaining axioms characterize exactly two voting rules – majority rule and rank-order voting – on rich domains (domains for which no candidate is always best or worst).
1. Introduction

Current election methods leave much room for improvement. In the United States, Donald Trump won none of his first 17 victories in the 2016 Republican primaries by a majority: mainstream Republicans “canceled” each other out by splitting the anti-Trump vote. In France, far-right candidate Marine Le Pen made it to the runoff of the 2017 presidential election even though almost certainly, she would have lost to François Fillon (eliminated in the first round) in a head-to-head contest. Better election methods would probably have prevented these anomalies.

Of course, there are many possible election methods, called voting rules, to choose from. Here are a few examples.

In plurality rule (used to elect MPs in the U.K. and members of Congress in the U.S., and to award a state’s electoral votes in U.S. presidential elections), each citizen votes for a candidate, and the winner is the candidate with the most votes, even if short of majority.\(^2\)

In runoff voting there are two rounds. First, each citizen votes for one candidate. If some candidate gets a majority, she wins. Otherwise, the top two vote-getters face each other in a runoff that determines the winner.\(^4\)

Under majority rule – advocated by the Marquis de Condorcet (Condorcet 1785) – each voter ranks the candidates in order of preference. The winner is then the candidate who, according to the rankings, beats each opponent in a head-to-head contest.

In rank-order voting (the Borda count) – proposed by Condorcet’s intellectual archrival Jean-Charles Borda (Borda 1781) – voters again rank the candidates. With \(n\) candidates, a

\(^2\) There can be a tie, an issue that arises for the other voting rules we mention and that is dealt with formally in section 3.

\(^3\) Plurality rule was the method the Republican Party adopted for many of its 2016 primaries.

\(^4\) Runoff voting is used for presidential elections in France, Russia, Brazil, and many other countries.
candidate gets \( n \) points for every voter who ranks her first, \( n - 1 \) points for a second-place vote, and so on. The winner is the candidate with the most points.

Each voting rule so far is ordinal in the sense that the way a citizen votes can be deduced from his ordinal preferences over candidates (we define ordinality formally in section 3). Next are two voting rules that are cardinal (i.e., a citizen’s vote depends on more than just ordinal preferences).

In approval voting, each citizen approves as many candidates as he wants. The winner is the candidate with the most approvals. The voting rule fails ordinality because a citizen’s preference ordering doesn’t by itself determine the boundary between “approved” and “unapproved” candidates.

In range voting, a citizen grades each candidate on, say, a ten-point scale (“1” denotes dreadful and “10” denotes superb). A candidate’s points are then summed over citizens, and the candidate with the biggest total score wins.

Faced with all these possibilities, how should society decide what voting rule to adopt? Ever since Arrow (1951), a standard answer is for society to first consider what it wants in a voting rule, i.e., to (i) posit a set of principles or axioms that any good voting rule should satisfy, and (ii) determine which voting rule(s) they are consistent with.

We use the axiomatic approach here (section 3 gives precise definitions of our axioms, which are all familiar from the literature). Specifically, we suppose that there is a large number

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5 More accurately, the way the citizen votes can be deduced if he is voting non-strategically. We consider strategic voting – a major theme of this paper – later in this introduction.

6 Behind approval voting is the idea that minimum quality – a cardinal concept – determines the boundary.

7 Two variants of range voting are (i) majority judgment (Balinski and Laraki 2010), which is the same as range voting except that the winner has the biggest median (not total) score and (ii) budget voting, in which a citizen has a set number of votes that he can allocate in way to the different candidates. The winner is, again, the candidate with the biggest total.
of voters and examine the *Pareto principle* (P) – if all citizens prefer candidate $x$ to $y$, then $y$ should not be elected; *anonymity* (A) – all citizens’ votes should count equally; *neutrality* (N) – all candidates should be treated equally; *decisiveness* (D) – the election should result in a clear-cut winner; *independence of irrelevant alternatives* (IIA) – if $x$ is the winner among a set of candidates $Y$ (the “ballot”), then $x$ must still be the winner if the ballot is reduced from $Y$ to $Y'$ by dropping some losing (“irrelevant”) candidates$^8$; and *ordinality* (O) – the winner should depend only on citizens’ *ordinal* rankings and not on preference intensities or other cardinal information.$^9$

Of these six axioms, IIA is arguably the least “obvious.” Moreover, it is the most controversial of these axioms, probably because some well-regarded voting rules, in particular, rank-order voting, violate it. To see what goes wrong with rank-order voting, consider Figure 1, in which there are three candidates $x$, $y$, and $z$ and two groups of voters, one (45% of the electorate) with preferences $x \succ z \succ y$ and the other (55%) with preferences $y \succ x \succ z$. If all 3 candidates run, then $x$ wins under rank-order voting. But if $z$ drops out, then $y$ wins.

Still, IIA has strong appeal, in part because it entails the idea that a voting rule should not be vulnerable to vote splitting. Vote splitting arises when candidate $x$ would beat $y$ in a one-on-one contest, but loses to $y$ when $z$ runs too (because $z$ splits off some of the vote that otherwise would go to $x$). See Figure 2 for an illustration that both plurality rule and runoff voting violate IIA too.

$^8$ Arrow (1951) and Nash (1950) formulate (nonequivalent) axioms with the name IIA. In this paper and its predecessor (Dasgupta and Maskin 2008), we adopt the Nash formulation, but could have used Arrow’s version instead (indeed, an early paper in this line of work, Maskin 1995, does just that.)

$^9$ Arrow (1951) notes that a citizen’s ordinal preference between $x$ and $y$ can be ascertained from a simple experiment: give the citizen the choice between $x$ and $y$. However, he argues that there is no reliable way of eliciting preference intensities. We support this view with Theorem 1 showing that cardinal voting rules can’t be strategy proof.
The Arrow Impossibility Theorem establishes that there is no voting rule satisfying all of P, A, N, D, IIA, and O with at least three candidates and unrestricted voter preferences (see Theorem A in section 3). In particular, majority rule – although it satisfies the other axioms – fails to be decisive, as Condorcet himself showed in a famous example of a “Condorcet cycle” (see Figure 3).

Thus, in Dasgupta and Maskin (2008), we argue that the natural follow-up question to Arrow is: Which voting rule satisfies these axioms for the widest class of restricted domains of preferences? That paper shows that there is a sharp answer to this question: majority rule. Specifically, Theorem B states that majority rule satisfies the six axioms when preferences are drawn from a given domain if and only that domain does not contain a Condorcet cycle. More strikingly, if some voting rule satisfies the six axioms on a given domain, then majority rule must also satisfy the axioms on that same domain. And, unless the voting rule we started with is itself majority rule, there exists another domain on which majority rule satisfies all six axioms and the original voting rule does not (Theorem C).

In this paper, we consider an additional, often-invoked axiom: strategy proofness (SP) – a voting rule should induce citizens to vote according to their true preferences, not strategically. There are at least two justifications for SP. First, if citizens do vote strategically, then the voting rule in question doesn’t produce the outcomes intended; since the rule’s inputs are distorted, so are the outputs. Second, strategic voting imposes a burden on citizens. It is hard enough for a

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10 Arrow (1951) considers social welfare functions (mappings from profiles to social rankings) rather than voting rules. However, making the translation from one kind of mapping to the other is straightforward. Arrow (1951) uses a weak form of A called nondictatorship and doesn’t require D or N; thus his version of the Impossibility Theorem is stronger than Theorem A.

11 A sufficient condition ruling out Condorcet cycles is that each voter is ideological: he ranks candidates according to how far away they are from him on a left-right continuum (this is an example of single-peaked preferences; for another example, see section 5). Another sufficient condition is that among each group of 3 candidates, there is one whom voters feel “strongly” about: he might be ranked first or third but never second (Donald Trump seems to have been such a candidate in 2016).
conscientious citizen to work out his own preferences: he has to study the candidates’ characters, backgrounds, and positions on the issues. If, on top of this, he must know other citizens’ preferences and strategies in order to react strategically to them, his decision problem becomes several orders of magnitude more difficult. For example, consider Figure 2. In a plurality rule election, Kasich supporters can stop Trump from winning by voting for Rubio, but this requires them to know this and coordinate on that manipulation.

Our first new result (Theorem 1 in section 4) establishes that any voting rule satisfying SP and D on a given domain must be ordinal. The proof is straightforward; indeed, the argument ruling out range voting is especially simple: Suppose there are two candidates $x$ and $y$ running and a particular citizen judges them both to be quite good. If he were grading honestly, he would give $x$ a grade of 8 and $y$ a grade of 7. But, in an election, he has the incentive to give $x$ a grade of 10 and $y$ a grade of 1 to maximize $x$’s chance of winning, a violation of SP.

Just as we ran into the Arrow Impossibility Theorem in our previous work, we collide with the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Impossibility Theorem (Gibbard 1973, Satterthwaite 1975) once we impose SP. A fortiori (in view of Theorem A), there exists no voting rule that satisfies all seven axioms when voters’ preferences are unrestricted. Indeed, there is no voting rule that even satisfies all of A, N, D, and SP (Theorem E). Hence, we turn our attention again to restricted domains and show that majority rule satisfies the seven axioms on any restricted domain without a Condorcet cycle (Theorem 2 in section 5).

Implicit in Theorem 2 is the assumption that voters are confined to the restricted domain in question when they misrepresent their preferences. As we argue in section 3, this assumption makes sense in some circumstances, but not all. Yet, when voters can misrepresent freely, a majority (Condorcet) winner may not exist. Thus, we must extend majority rule so that it always
produces a well-defined outcome. Specifically, we use the Smith set (Smith 1973, Fishburn 1977), the (unique) minimal subset of candidates that beat any other candidate by a majority. When a majority winner does not exist, we choose a random member of the Smith set as the outcome. Theorem 3 establishes that this extension of majority rule satisfies the seven axioms on any domain without Condorcet cycles.

Theorem C from Dasgupta-Maskin (2008) shows that majority rule dominates other voting rules in the sense of satisfying P, A, N, D, IIA, and O more often. When we add SP to the mix, majority rule is, in fact, uniquely characterized. Theorem 4 establishes that a voting rule satisfying, P, A, N, D, IIA, and SP (O is redundant) on some domain can only be majority rule.

Intuitively, coordinating manipulations in a large coalition is harder than in a small one. Hence, a proof that uses a large coalition to show that a voting rule violates SP may not be entirely convincing. Accordingly, Theorem 5 establishes the same result as Theorem 4 when coalitions are restricted to be of arbitrarily small size.

Finally, we drop the controversial axiom IIA. Theorem 6 in section 6 shows that, for the case of three candidates, a voting rule satisfying P, A, N, D, and SP on a rich domain (a domain for which no candidate is always top- or bottom-ranked) must be either majority rule or rank-order voting (the full proof is relegated to the Appendix). In this sense, Condorcet and Borda are the two heroes of our story.

2. Model

There is a finite set $X$ of potential candidates for a given office\textsuperscript{12}. The electorate is a continuum of voters, taken to be the unit interval $[0,1]$ (the continuum makes the probability that there is a tie for the winner negligible, an issue discussed in section 3).

\textsuperscript{12} A “potential” candidate is one who could conceivably run for the office in question, but, in the end, might not.
Each voter \( i \in [0,1] \) is described by his utility function \( u_i : X \rightarrow \mathbb{R} \). To simplify analysis, we rule indifference out by assumption. That is, for all \( x, y \in X \), if \( x \neq y \), then \( u_i(x) \neq u_i(y) \).

Let \( U_X \) consist of the utility functions on \( X \) without indifference. A profile \( u \) on \( U (\subseteq U_X) \) is a specification of a utility function \( u_i \in U \) for each voter \( i \in [0,1] \). A ballot is a subset \( Y (\subseteq X) \) consisting of the candidates who are actually running for the office. Let \( \Delta Y \) consist of the probability distributions over \( Y \).

A voting rule is a correspondence that, for each profile \( u \) and each ballot \( Y \), selects a subset \( F(u,Y) \subseteq \Delta Y \) such that \( |F(u,Y)| \leq 1 \).

For any set \( T \), \( |T| \) denotes the number of elements of \( T \).

This focus makes it easier to define the concept of a generic profile: see the discussion of decisiveness on section 3.
Lebesgue measure $\mu$ on $[0,1]$. Thus, for profile $u$, $\mu\left(\{i \mid u_i(x) > u_i(y)\}\right)$ is the proportion of voters who prefer candidate $x$ to candidate $y$.

We can now formally define the voting rules mentioned in the introduction. We suppose that if there is tie, it is broken randomly. That is, if $W$ is the set of candidates who tie for first, the outcome is $q(W)$, a random selection (with equal probabilities) from $W$. Here is the definition of plurality rule:

**Plurality Rule** (First-Past-the-Post):

$$F^P(u_i, Y) = q\left(\{x \in Y \mid \mu\left(\{i \mid u_i(x) > u_i(y) \text{ for all } y \neq x, y \in Y\}\right) \geq \mu\left(\{i \mid u_i(x') > u_i(y) \text{ for all } y \neq x', y \in Y\}\right) \text{ for all } x' \in Y\right)$$

In words, candidate $x$ wins if a higher proportion of voters rank $x$ first than they do any other candidate $x'$. If there are multiple such $x$, one is selected at random.\(^{15}\)

### 3. Axioms

We now define our axioms, which with two small exceptions are standard in the voting literature.\(^{16}\) We say that a voting rule satisfies a given axiom on domain $U$ if the axiom holds for all profiles $u_i$ drawn from $U$.

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\(^{15}\)Definitions of other rules can be found in the Appendix.

\(^{16}\)Decisiveness and strategy proofness are slightly nonstandard because they explicitly deal with ties (ties are usually ruled out by assumption; for example, in the literature on majority rule the number of the voters is typically assumed to be odd).
Pareto Principle (P) on $U$: For all $u \in U$, $y \in X$, and $x, y \in Y$, if $u_i(x) > u_i(y)$ for all $i$, then $y \not\in F(u, Y)$. That is, if everyone prefers $x$ to $y$ and $x$ is on the ballot, then $y$ can’t be elected.

Anonymity (A) on $U$: Fix any measure-preserving\(^\text{17}\) permutation of the electorate $\pi : [0,1] \to [0,1]$. For any $u \in U$, let $u^\pi$ be the profile such that, for all $i$, $u_i^\pi = u_{\pi(i)}$. Then, for all $Y$, if $x = F(u, Y)$, we have $x = F(u^\pi, Y)$. In words, if we permute a profile so that voter $j$ gets $i$’s preferences, $k$ gets $j$’s preferences, etc., the winner remains the same.

Neutrality (N) on $U$: Fix any ballot $Y$ and any permutation $\rho : Y \to Y$ of $Y$. For any profile $u \in U$, suppose $u_i^{\rho,Y}$ is a profile on $U$ such that, for all $i$, $u_i^{\rho,Y}(\rho(x)) = u_i(x)$ for all $x \in Y$. Then, if $x = F(u, Y)$, we have $F(u_i^{\rho,Y}, Y) = \rho(x)$. That is, suppose we start with a profile in $U$ and we (i) permute the candidates so that candidate $x$ becomes $y$, $y$ becomes $z$, etc., and (ii) permute voters’ utilities for the candidates correspondingly. Assume that the resulting profile is in $U$.

Then if $x$ won originally, now $y$ wins.

P, A, and N are so “natural” that few voting rules used in practice or studied theoretically violate any of them. The same is not true of the next axiom.

Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) on $U$: For any $u \in U$ and any ballot $Y$, if $x = F(u, Y)$ and $x \in Y' \subseteq Y$, then $x = F(u, Y')$.

As mentioned before, IIA gets at the idea that voting rules shouldn’t be vulnerable to vote splitting. However, it rules out plurality rule, runoff voting, and rank-order voting (leaving only majority rule, approval voting, and range voting from the introduction).

We next have:

\(^{17}\) “Measure-preserving” means that, for any $C \subseteq [0,1]$, $\mu(C) = \mu(\pi(C))$. 
Ordinality (O) on $U$: For all $u$, and $u'$ on $U$ and all $Y \subseteq X$, if $u_i(x) > u_i(y) \iff u'_i(x) > u'_i(y)$ for all $i \in [0,1]$ and all $x, y \in Y$, then $F(u, Y) = F(u', Y)$. That is, only voters’ rankings – and not cardinal information about preferences – determines the winner.

We next turn to decisiveness, the principle that there should be a unique nonstochastic winner. In fact, none of the voting rules from the introduction is decisive in this sense; for each ties may occur. For example, with plurality rule, two (or more) candidates might be ranked first by a maximal proportion of voters. Nevertheless, if the number of voters is large, the likelihood of a tie under plurality rule is small. That is why we assume a continuum of voters: the probability of a tie under plurality rule is zero, or, more precisely, ties are nongeneric. To express this formally, fix a (finitely based) voting rule $F$ with base set $S$ and mappings $h_i: U_x \to S$ for all $i \in [0,1]$. Given profile $u$, let

$$m_s = \mu \left( \{ i \mid h_i(u) = s \} \right)$$

for each $s \in S$, i.e., $m_s$ is the proportion of voters whose utility functions correspond to $s$ in $u$.

Decisiveness (D) on $U$: For any $Y$, $F$ results in a unique deterministic winner for generic $(m_1, \ldots, m_n)$ on $U$, i.e., the Lebesgue measure of the set of $|S|$-tuples for which there are ties is zero when profiles are drawn from $U$.

It is easy to verify that all the voting rules in the introduction (except majority rule) satisfy D on any domain $U$.

We can now state a straightforward version of the Arrow Impossibility Theorem:

**Theorem A** (Arrow 1951): If $|X| \geq 3$ and $U = U_x$, there exists no voting rule satisfying all of P, A, N, IIA, D, and O.
In view of this negative result, Dasgupta-Maskin (2008) considers restricted domains $U$. Specifically, although majority rule $F^C$ violates D on $U_x$, as Condorcet’s own example (Figure 3) illustrates, this problem cannot arise on $U$ as long as $U$ does not contain Condorcet cycles (i.e., it doesn’t contain utility functions $u, u', u''$ and candidates $x, y, z$ such that $u(x) > u(y) > u(z), u'(y) > u'(z) > u'(x)$, and $u''(z) > u''(x) > u''(y)$):

Theorem B (Dasgupta-Maskin 2008; see also Sen 1966 and Inada 1969): $F^C$ satisfies P, A, N, IIA, O, and D on $U$ if and only if $U$ does not contain Condorcet cycles. Moreover, when $U$ doesn’t have Condorcet cycles, Condorcet winners are generically strict (i.e., the winner beats all other candidates by a strict majority).

Furthermore, majority rule dominates all other voting rules in the sense that it satisfies the axioms on a wider class of domains than any other:

Theorem C (Dasgupta-Maskin 2008): If $F$ satisfies P, A, N, IIA, D, and O on domain $U$, then $F^C$ also satisfies these axioms on $U$. Furthermore, if $F(u, Y) \neq F^C(u, Y)$ for some profile $u$ on $U$, then there exists domain $U'$ on which $F^C$ satisfies all the axioms, but $F$ does not.

The current paper’s contribution is to add strategy-proofness to the mix:

(Group) Strategy-Proofness (SP) on $U$: For a generic profile $u_*$ on $U$, all coalitions $C \subseteq [0,1]$, all profiles $u'_i$ (with $u'_i = u_i$ for all $i \notin C$) on $U$ and all ballots $Y$, suppose $x = F(u_*, Y)$. Then, there exist $i \in C$ and $y \in \text{supp } F(u'_*, Y)$ such that $u_i(x) > u_i(y)$. That is, if coalition $C$ causes the winner to change from $x$ to $y$ by manipulating preferences from $u_C$ to $u'_C$ (here we are

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$^{18}$ $\text{supp } F(u'_*, Y)$ is the set of candidates from which the winner is selected randomly.
supposing the manipulated outcome is nonstochastic), someone in the coalition doesn’t gain from the manipulation.\textsuperscript{19}

**4. Strategy-Proofness and Ordinality**

Together with D, SP implies that a voting rule is generically ordinal:

*Theorem 1:* Suppose that $F$ satisfies SP and D on $U$. Then, $F$ satisfies O for generic profiles on $U$.

**Proof:** Suppose, to the contrary, that there exist generic profiles $u_i^*$ and $u_i^{**}$ and ballot $y \subseteq x$ such that $u_i^*(x) > u_i^*(y) \Leftrightarrow u_i^{**}(x) > u_i^{**}(y)$ for all $i \in [0,1]$ and $x, y \in Y$ and yet $x^* \neq x^{**}$, where

$x^* = F(u_i^*, Y)$ and $x^{**} = F(u_i^{**}, Y)$. We will show that transforming $u_i^*$ to $u_i^{**}$ one ordering at a time leads to contradiction.

Let $\succ^1$ be an ordering of $Y$ and let $u_i^1$ be the profile such that, for all $i$,

$$u_i^1 = \begin{cases} u_i^{**}, & \text{if } \succ^1 \text{ is the ordering corresponding to } u_i^{**} \\ u_i^*, & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

Take $x^1 = F(u_i^1, Y)$. If $x^* \succ x^1$, then voters with ordering $\succ^1$ in profile $u_i^1$ (each such voter $i$ has utility function $u_i^{**}$) are better off manipulating to make the profile $u_i^*$ (i.e., voter $i$ will pretend to have utility function $u_i^*$). If $x^1 \succ x^*$, then voters with ordering $\succ^1$ in profile $u_i^*$ are better off manipulating to make the profile $u_i^1$. Thus, from SP, we must have $x^1 = x^*$.

\textsuperscript{19} If instead supp $F(u_i^*, Y)$ is multi-valued, then implicitly we are assuming that voter $i$ is deterred from deviating by the positive probability of an outcome worse than $x$. 
Next choose $\succeq^2 \neq \succeq^1$ and let $u_i^3$ be the profile such that, for all $i$,

$$u_i^3 = \begin{cases} 
    u_i^{**}, & \text{if } \succeq^2 \text{ is the ordering corresponding to } u_i^{**} \\
    u_i^1, & \text{otherwise}
\end{cases}$$

By similar argument, $x^2 = x^*$ where $x^2 = F(u^2, Y)$ . Continuing iteratively, we eventually obtain $u_i'' = u_i^{**}$ (since there are only finitely many orderings) and thus $x'' = x^{**}$, a contradiction of $x^* \neq x^{**}$. Q.E.D.

5. Results Invoking IIA

In view of Theorems A and 1, we immediately obtain

**Theorem D:** If $|X| \geq 3$ there exists no voting rule satisfying P, A, N, IIA, D, and SP on $U_X$.\(^{20}\)

Hence, we show that Theorem B continues to hold if we add SP to the list of axioms:

**Theorem 2:** $F^C$ satisfies P, A, N, IIA, D and SP on $U$ if and only if $U$ does not contain Condorcet cycles.\(^{21}\)

**Proof:** If $U$ contains a Condorcet cycle, then from Figure 3, $F^C$ violates D. For the converse, it suffices – in view of Theorem B – to show that $F^C$ satisfies SP on $U$. Suppose, to the contrary, there exist generic $u_i$ and profile $u'_i$ on $U$, and coalition $C$ such that

1. $x = F^C(u_i, Y)$, where $x$ is a strict Condorcet winner

and

2. $u_i(y) > u_i(x)$ for all $i \in C$,

for all

3. $y \in \text{supp } F^C(u'_i, Y)$.

\(^{20}\) This result also follows directly from Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite (1975), except that they also impose O.

\(^{21}\) In view of Theorem 1, O is redundant.
where \( u'_j = u_j \) for all \( j \in C \). From (3)

\[
(4) \quad \mu(\{i | u'_i(y) > u'_i(x)\}) \geq \frac{1}{2}.
\]

Hence, from (2) and (4),

\[
\mu(\{i | u_i(y) > u_i(x)\}) \geq \frac{1}{2},
\]

which contradicts (1), the fact that \( x \) is a strict Condorcet winner for \( u \). Q.E.D

Our definition of SP presumes that voters can manipulate preferences only within \( U \). This presumption makes sense in some circumstances. For example, suppose there are two goods – one public and one private – and that a “candidate” \( x \) consists of a level \( p \) of the public good together with a tax \( cp \) levied on each citizen, where \( c \) is the per capita cost of the public good in terms of the private good. Consider the mechanism in which each citizen \( i \) chooses \( p_i \), the median choice \( p^* \) is implemented, and each citizen pays \( cp^* \). If citizens’ preferences are convex and increasing in the two goods, then preferences for candidates \( x \) are single-peaked. Hence, the mechanism results in a Condorcet winner (see Black 1948).

Implicitly, the mechanism constrains a citizen to submit single-peaked preference, and thus presumes that the planner knows in advance that preferences are single-peaked. While this may be plausible in the public good context, knowing how preferences are restricted for presidential elections seems less likely. In such settings, constraining manipulations to \( U \) seems unreasonable. Thus, the definition of strategy proofness becomes:
**Strategy-Proofness**\(^*$\) (SP\(^*$\)) on \(U\): For each \(C \subseteq [0,1]\) and generic profiles \(u\) on \(U\) and profile \(u'\) on \(U\)\(^{22}\) (with \(u'_j = u_j\) for all \(j \not\in C\)), suppose \(x = F(u, Y)\). Then there exist \(i \in C\) and \(y \in \text{supp}(F(u', Y))\) such that \(u_i(x) > u_i(y)\).

Since coalitions now can manipulate outside \(U\), a Condorcet winner may not exist.

Following Smith (1973) and Fishburn (1977), define the Smith set \(Z(u, Y)\) (\(\subseteq Y\)) for profile \(u\) and ballot \(Y\) to be the set of all Condorcet winners (if there is one) or else a minimal set of candidates such that, for each \(x \in Z(u, Y)\) and each \(y \not\in Y - Z(u, Y)\), a majority of voters prefer \(x\) to \(y\). The Smith set is unique (as Fishburn shows); it is a natural generalization of the majority winner concept. Indeed, Fishburn (1977) argues that the following extension of majority voting rule best preserves the spirit of Condorcet:

\[
F^{C^*}(u, Y) = \begin{cases} 
  x, \text{ if } x \text{ is the unique Condorcet winner for } u \text{ and } Y \\
  q(Z(u, Y)), \text{ if a Condorcet winner doesn't exist or is multiple}
\end{cases}
\]

**Theorem 3**: \(F^{C^*}\) satisfies P, A, N, IIA, D and SP\(^*$\) on \(U\) if and only if \(U\) contains no Condorcet cycles.

**Proof**: In view of the proof of Theorem 2, we need show only that if \(U\) contains no Condorcet cycles and \(u\) is a generic profile on \(U\), then, no coalition \(C\) gains by manipulating. Suppose, to the contrary, that \(x = F^{C^*}(u, Y)\) is a strict Condorcet winner and coalition \(C\) gains from manipulation \(u'_i\) (where \(u'_i = u_i\) for all \(i \not\in C\)).

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\(^{22}\) The only change in going from SP to SP\(^*$\) is that \(u'_i\) is no longer restricted to \(U\).
If $Z(u',Y)$ consists of Condorcet winners, then we obtain the same contradiction as in the proof of Theorem 2. Hence, suppose that $Z(u',Y) = \{x^1, \ldots, x^m\}$, where no $x'$ is a Condorcet winner.

Assume first that $x \in \{x^1, \ldots, x^m\}$. By definition of the Smith set, there exists $k \in \{1, \ldots, m\}$ such that

$$(5) \quad \mu(\{i|u_i(x^k) > u_i(x)\}) \geq \frac{1}{2}$$

(otherwise, $x$ is a Condorcet winner)

Because $C$ gains from the manipulation

$$(6) \quad u_i(x^k) > u_i(x) \quad \text{for all } i \in C$$

And so, from (5) and (6)

$$\mu(\{i|u_i(x^k) > u_i(x)\}) \geq \frac{1}{2},$$

which contradicts the fact that $x$ is a strict Condorcet winner for $u$.

If $x \notin \{x^1, \ldots, x^m\}$, then (5) holds for all $k \in \{1, \ldots, m\}$ and the rest of the argument is the same. Q.E.D.

Strikingly, the axioms under discussion uniquely characterize majority rule on any domain that admits a voting rule satisfying these axioms:

Theorem 4: If $F$ satisfies P, A, N, IIA, D, and SP on $\mathcal{U}$, then $F = F^C$ on $\mathcal{U}$.

Remark 1: This result provides an alternative to the classic axiomatization of majority rule by May (1952). May’s characterization does not impose D (because it is not concerned with SP) and
invokes *Positive Association* rather than SP. Also, it focuses on the case $|Y| = 2$, which is of limited interest because then plurality rule, runoff voting, rank-order voting and many other rules all coincide with majority rule.

**Remark 2:** An important difference between Theorem 4 and Theorem C is that, in the latter, P, A, N, IIA, D and O don’t *uniquely* characterize $F^C$.

**Proof:** The proof is remarkably simple. Suppose $F$ satisfies the axioms on $U$. From Theorem 1, we can confine attention to ordinal preferences (rankings). Assume first that $|Y| = 2$, i.e.,

$$Y = \{x, y\}.$$ If $U$ contains only the ranking $x \succ y$, then the result follows from P. Hence, assume that

$U$ contains both $x \succ y$ and $y \succ x$. If, contrary to the theorem,

$$F \left( \frac{a}{x}, \frac{1-a}{y}, \{x, y\} \right) = y,$$

where $a > \frac{1}{2}$ for some generic profile $\frac{a}{x}, \frac{1-a}{y}, \frac{x}{y}$,

then from N and A

$$F \left( \frac{a}{y}, \frac{1-a}{x}, \{x, y\} \right) = x.$$ But, in profile (8), if a coalition of voters with ranking $y \succ x$ pretends to have ranking $x \succ y$ so as to attain profile (7), then they attain outcome $y$, which they prefer to $x$. Hence SP is violated and the theorem is established for $|Y| = 2$.

Assume next that $|Y| > 2$. If

---

23 *Positive Responsiveness* says that if we alter voters’ preferences between $x$ and $y$ so that all voters like $x$ at least as much vis a vis $y$ as they did before and some now like $x$ strictly more, then (i) if $x$ and $y$ were both chosen by $F$ before, now $x$ is uniquely chosen, and (ii) if $x$ was uniquely chosen before, it still is.
then from IIA

$$F\left(\frac{a}{x}, \frac{1-a}{y}, y, x, x, y\right) = y,$$ where $a > \frac{1}{2}$

contradicting the previous paragraph. Q.E.D.

SP is demanding in the sense that a voting rule must be unmanipulable by coalitions of any size. Let us relax this axiom. Call a voting rule $F$ manipulable on $U$ if, for all $\varepsilon > 0$, there exist coalition $C$ with $|C| < \varepsilon$, profiles $u_i$ and $u'_i$ on $U$ (with $u'_i = u_i$ for all $i \notin C$), ballot $Y$, and $x, y \in Y$ such that $x = F(u_i, Y)$, $y = F(u'_i, Y)$, and $u_i(y) > u_i(x)$ for all $i \in C$. That is, a voting rule is manipulable if there exists a coalition of arbitrarily small size that can benefit from misrepresenting. Because imposing a limit on a coalition’s size makes profitable manipulations harder, the following is a relaxation of SP:

Weak Strategy-Proofness (WSP) on $U$: $F$ is not manipulable on $U$.24

Theorems 2 and 3 clearly continue to hold when WSP replaces SP because the latter implies the former. Showing that Theorem 1 still holds with this substitution is also relatively easy.25 We now establish a stronger version of Theorem 4:

**Theorem 5:** If $F$ satisfies P, A, N, IIA, D, and WSP on $U$, then $F = F^C$ on $U$.

---

24 We thank Shengwu Li, who suggested that we consider this version of strategy-proofness.

25 Specifically, consider the proof of Theorem 1 and fix $\varepsilon > 0$. For each ordering $\succ^i$, we can partition the sets of utility functions $u'_i$ and $u''_i$ corresponding to $\succ^i$ into subsets of measure no greater than $\varepsilon$. Then rather than changing all the $u'_i s$ to $u''_i s$ at the same time (as in the current proof), we can change the subsets sequentially (so no coalition manipulating is bigger than $\varepsilon$)
Proof: Suppose $F$ satisfies the axioms on $U$. As in the proof of Theorem 4, we start with the case $Y = \{x, y\}$. Fix $\varepsilon > 0$ and suppose there exists generic profile where

$$\begin{align*}
a &> \frac{1}{2} > 1 - a \\ \frac{a}{x} &> \frac{1 - a}{y} \text{ where}
\end{align*}$$

and

$$F\left(\frac{a}{x}, \frac{1 - a}{y}\right) = y.$$ (9) $a > \frac{1}{2} > 1 - a$ with $|2a - 1| < \varepsilon$

Then we can apply $N$ and $A$ to obtain a contradiction of WSP just like the contradiction of SP in the proof of Theorem 4, since the manipulation entailed is by a coalition of size less than $\varepsilon$.

Hence, for any $a$ satisfying (9) we have

$$F\left(\frac{a}{x}, \frac{1 - a}{y}\right) = x.$$ (11) $F\left(\frac{a}{x}, \frac{1 - a}{y}\right) = x.$

Next consider $a'$ with

$$a' > \frac{1}{2} > 1 - a' \text{ with } |2a' - 1| < 2\varepsilon.$$ (12) $a' > \frac{1}{2} > 1 - a' \text{ with } |2a' - 1| < 2\varepsilon$

If

$$F\left(\frac{a'}{x}, \frac{1 - a'}{y}\right) = y,$$

then, from (11) and (12), a coalition of voters with ranking $\frac{x}{y}$ and size smaller than $\varepsilon$ can pretend to have ranking $\frac{y}{x}$ and thereby change the outcome to $x$, contradicting WSP.

Proceeding iteratively, we can show that (11) holds for all $a$ satisfying $a > 1 - a$. Hence

$$F = F^C \text{ on } U.$$

The rest of the proof is the same as that for Theorem 4.
6. Dropping IIA: Condorcet and Borda

Let us now drop IIA, the most controversial axiom. With an unrestricted domain, we continue to get impossibility:

**Theorem E:** If \(|X| \geq 3\), there exists no voting rule satisfying P, A, N, D, and SP on \(U_x\).\(^{26}\)

Define a domain \(U\) to be *rich* if for all \(x \in X\) there exist \(u \in U\) and \(y, z \in X\) such that \(u(y) > u(x) > u(z)\), i.e., \(x\) is not extremal. We now state our final result:

**Theorem 6:** Suppose \(|X| = 3\). If \(F\) satisfies P, A, N, D, and SP on \(U\) and \(U\) is rich, then \(F = F_C\) or \(F = F_B\). That is, a voting rule satisfying the axioms on a rich domain must either be majority rule or rank-order voting.

**Remark 1:** The richness hypothesis is essential for the result. Suppose that \(X = \{x, y, z\}\),

\[
U = \begin{cases} 
  x & \text{for all } i \\
  z & \text{for all } i \\
  y & \text{for all } i
\end{cases}
\]

\(F(u, \{x, y, z\}) = \begin{cases} 
  x, & \text{if } u_i = _x^y \\
  z, & \text{if } u_i = _y^z \\
  y, & \text{otherwise}
\end{cases}
\)

It is easy to see that \(F\) satisfies all the axioms and is neither majority rule nor the Borda count. This doesn’t contradict Theorem 6, however, because \(U\) is not rich; \(x\) and \(z\) are always extremal. Intuitively, richness allows us to permute alternatives in \(X\) while remaining in \(U\). Thus, \(N\) has more bite on a rich domain than on a smaller one.

\(^{26}\) This follows from the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem (and Theorem 1).
Remark 2: Theorem 6 limits attention to $|X| = 3$, but this is a theoretically important case, since all major voting rules differ for three candidates (unlike for $|X| = 2$). Moreover, $|X| = 3$ is also the most significant case *practically* speaking. For example, in 2016, third-place finishers changed the winner in 6% of the U.S. Senate races (that is, three candidates mattered in these races). But in no case was a fourth-place finisher decisive.\(^{27}\)

The proof of Theorem 6 is long and complicated, so is relegated to the Appendix. Here is an outline of the argument:

**Step 1:** We first show that $F^B$ is the unique voting rule satisfying the axioms on the Condorcet cycle domain\(^{28}\)

$$U^{CC} = \{x y z, y z x, z x y\}.$$  

Barbie-Puppe-Tasnad (2006) show that $F^B$ satisfies the axioms on this domain. Thus, it suffices to show that no other voting rule $F$ does too. Consider generic profile

$$u_1 = \begin{bmatrix} a & b & 1-a-b \\ x & y & z \\ y & z & x \\ z & x & y \end{bmatrix}$$

for which $F^B$ and $F$ differ. From symmetry, we can assume without loss of generality that

---

\(^{27}\) I thank Cecilia Johnson for research assistance on this point.  
\(^{28}\) An example in which the Condorcet cycle domain arises naturally is the Israeli-Palestinian dispute over land. Suppose that there are three options: a two-state solution ($x$); a democratic one-state solution ($y$), in which all land is controlled by the State of Israel, but Palestinian Arabs in Israel have a vote; and an undemocratic one-state solution ($z$), in which only Jews have a vote. Right-wing voters tend to have ranking $z x y$; left-wing voters have ranking $x y z$; and those primarily interested in unification have ranking $y z x$.  

(13) \( F^B(u, \{x, y, z\}) = x \).

Assume that

(14) \( F(u, \{x, y, z\}) = y \)

Let \( \sigma \) be the permutation such that \( \sigma(x) = z, \sigma(y) = x, \sigma(z) = y \). From (14), A, and N

(15) \[
F \left( \begin{array}{ccc}
\frac{a}{x} & \frac{b}{z} & \frac{1-a-b}{y} \\
\frac{x}{y} & \frac{z}{y} & \frac{x}{z}
\end{array} , \{x, y, z\} \right) = x
\]

If

(16) \( a > 1 - a - b > b \)

(which is consistent with (13)), then some voters with ranking \( x \) in profile \( u \) could pretend to have ranking \( y \) and others could pretend to have \( z \) so as to induce profile (15). Through this manipulation, they change the outcome of \( F \) from \( y \) to \( x \), which they prefer – a violation of SP.

The other cases (when \( F(u, \{x, y, z\}) = z \), or when (16) doesn’t hold) are similar and handled in the Appendix.

Intuitively, \( F^B \) satisfies SP on \( U^{CC} \) because if voter \( i \) prefers \( x \) to \( y \) and attempts to reduce \( y \)'s chance of winning by ranking it lower, then the relative ranks of \( x \) and \( y \) must remain the same, and so their relative Borda scores remains the same - - the manipulation is useless. But this is not true for other voting rules, and so they violate SP.

**Step 2:** We next show that there exists no voting rule satisfying the axioms on any expansion of \( U^{CC} \).

From symmetry it suffices to consider
\[ U^* = \{ x \ y \ z \ x \ y \ z \ x \ x \ y \ y \} \].

Suppose to the contrary that \( F \) satisfies the axioms on \( U^* \). For small \( d > 0 \), we have

\[
(17) \quad F \left( \frac{1}{3} \cdot \begin{array}{ccc}
\frac{1-2d}{x} & \frac{1+2d}{y} & \frac{1-2d}{z} \\
y & z & x \\
z & x & y \\
\end{array}, \{x, y, z\} \right) = y,
\]

since for this profile, \( y \) is the Borda winner and, from step 1, \( F = F^B \) on \( U^{CC} \). Assume that

\[
(18) \quad F \left( \frac{1}{3} \cdot \begin{array}{ccc}
\frac{1-2d}{x} & \frac{1+2d}{y} & \frac{1-2d}{z} \\
y & z & x \\
z & x & y \\
\end{array}, \{x, y, z\} \right) = x.
\]

But then the \( \frac{x}{y} \) and \( \frac{z}{y} \) voters in (17) are better off pretending to have ranking \( \frac{x}{z} \) so as to induce profile (18) and outcome \( x \), which they prefer to \( y \). Similar violations of SP can be deduced when the outcome for profile (18) is \( y \) or \( z \). The final step of the proof is:

**Step 3**: We show that any voting rule satisfying the axioms on a rich domain without a Condorcet cycle must be majority rule.

The argument is similar to that for Step 1, i.e., we permute the candidates and then apply A and N to obtain a contradiction with SP.

Steps 1 and 2 establish that a voting rule satisfying the axioms on a rich domain with a Condorcet cycle must be the Borda count. Step 3 shows that a voting rule satisfying the axioms on a rich domain without a Condorcet cycle must be majority rule.
Theorem 6 may help resolve a historical tension. Majority rule and rank-order voting are the longest-studied voting rules, and their most famous proponents – Condorcet and Borda – were archrivals. It is satisfying to see that, in a sense, these old adversaries were both right.

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so $x$ wins

But if $z$ doesn’t run, we have

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so $y$ wins

Figure 1 Rank-order Voting
For the rankings above, Trump wins (with 40%) under plurality rule. However, both Kasich and Rubio would defeat Trump in a head-to-head contest (and, indeed, there is evidence from 2016 polls to back-up this hypothetical). They lose in a 3-way race because they split the anti-Trump vote. Hence, plurality rule violates IIA. Runoff voting does too: Rubio wins in a three-way race (first Kasich is dropped and then Rubio defeats Trump in the runoff), but Kasich wins head-to-head against Rubio.

Figure 2 Vote Splitting

Given the rankings above, candidate z can’t be the winner under majority rule because a majority of voters (68%) prefer y. Moreover, y can’t be the winner because majority (67%) prefer x. But x can’t win because a majority (67%) prefer y. The three rankings constitute Condorcet cycle.
References


Appendix:

Voting Rule Definitions

Majority Rule (Condorcet’s method):

\[ F^C(u_i, Y) = \mu \left( \{ \left. x \in Y \right| \mu(\{i|u_i(x) > u_i(y)\}) \geq \frac{1}{2} \text{ for all } y \neq x, y \in Y \} \right) \]

That is, candidate \( x \) is a Condorcet winner if, for any other candidate \( y \), a majority prefer \( x \) to \( y \).

Rank-Order Voting (Borda count):

\[ F^B(u_i, Y) = q(\{ x \in Y \left| \int r_{u_i}(x)d\mu(i) \geq \int r_{u_i}(y)d\mu(i) \text{ for all } y \in Y \} ), \]

where \( r_{u_i}(x) = \left| \{ y \in Y \left| u_i(x) \geq u_i(y) \right\} \right| \)

In words, candidate \( x \)’s point-score \( r_{u_i}(x) \) for voter \( i \) with preferences \( u_i \) is the number of candidates that voter \( i \) ranks no higher than \( x \). Candidate \( x \) is a Borda winner if the integral of her point-scores over voters is no lower than that of any other candidate \( y \). Approval Voting:

For each voter \( i \) and each utility function \( u_i \), let \( u_{\mu} \) be the minimum utility that a candidate must generate to gain \( i \)’s “approval.”

Then

\[ F^A(u_i, Y) = q(\{ x \in Y \left| \mu(\{i|u_i(x) \geq u_{\mu} \}) \geq \mu(\{i|u_i(y) \geq u_{\mu} \} \text{ for all } y \in Y \} \}) \]

That is, candidate \( x \) is an approval winner if the proportion of voters who approve her is at least as big as that of any other candidate.
Proof of Theorem 6

Step 1: We first show that $F^B$ is the unique voting rule that satisfies A, N, D and SP on

$$U^c = \{x, y, z\}.$$ 

We already noted that the fact that $F^B$ satisfies SP on $U^c$ follows from Barbie et al (2006) ($F^B$ always satisfies P, A, N, and D). Thus it suffices to show that no other voting rule $F$ satisfies the axioms on this domain. Consider profile

$$u_c = \begin{pmatrix} a & b & 1-a-b \\ x & y & z \\ y & z & x \\ z & x & y \end{pmatrix}$$

where $a$ and $b$ are the proportions of voters with the corresponding ranking. From symmetry, we can assume without loss of generality that $x$ is the Borda winner for this profile.

Case I: Suppose that $y$ beats $z$ according to the Borda count.

Then because $x$ beats $y$, we have $2a + 1 - a - b > 2b + a > 2(1 - a - b) + b$,

and so

$$(A.1) \quad a > \frac{1}{3} > b \quad \text{and} \quad a + b > 2/3$$

1.1 Suppose that $F(u_c, Y) = y$, i.e.,

$$F \begin{pmatrix} a & b & 1-a-b \\ x & y & z \\ y & z & x \\ z & x & y \end{pmatrix} = y \quad \text{henceforth, we suppress the argument } Y,$$

which is always equal to $\{x, y, z\}$

Let $\sigma$ be the permutation of $Y = \{x, y, z\}$ such that $\sigma(y) = x \quad \sigma(z) = z$ and $\sigma(z) = y$
Then from A, N and (A.2)

\[
\begin{pmatrix}
  a & b & 1-a-b \\
  z & x & y \\
  x & y & z \\
  y & z & x \\
\end{pmatrix} = x
\]

(A.3) 

1.1.1 Suppose \( 1-a-b > b \)

Then some voters with ranking \( x \prec y \prec z \) in profile \( u \). could pretend to have ranking \( y \prec z \prec x \) and some others could pretend to have \( z \prec x \prec y \) so as to attain the profile in (A.3). Thus, through this manipulation, they will change the outcome of \( F \) from \( y \) to \( x \), which they prefer, a violation of SP. Hence,

1.1.2 \( b > 1-a-b \)

1.1.2.1 Suppose

\[
\begin{pmatrix}
  1-2b & b & b \\
  x & y & z \\
  y & z & x \\
  z & x & y \\
\end{pmatrix} = x
\]

Then some \( x \)-voters in profile \( u \). could pretend to have ranking \( z \prec x \), and change the outcome from \( y \) to \( x \), a violation of SP.

1.1.2.2 Suppose

\[
\begin{pmatrix}
  1-2b & b & b \\
  x & y & z \\
  y & z & x \\
  z & x & y \\
\end{pmatrix} = y
\]

(A.4) 

Then applying $\sigma$ to (A.4), we get from A and N

$$F \begin{pmatrix} 1-2b & b & b \\ z & x & y \\ x & y & z \\ y & z & x \end{pmatrix} = x,$$

which implies that $y$-voters in $u$. can change the outcome from $y$ to $x$, a violation of SP.

Hence,

$$F \begin{pmatrix} 1-2b & b & b \\ z & x & y \\ x & y & z \\ y & z & x \end{pmatrix} = z$$

But from (A.5), $x$-voters in (A.3) can pretend to have ranking $y$ and change the outcome from $x$ to $z$, a violation of SP. We conclude that case I.1 is impossible.

Hence we have

1.2 $F(u., Y) = z$, i.e.,

$$F \begin{pmatrix} a & b & 1-a-b \\ x & y & z \\ y & z & x \\ z & x & y \end{pmatrix} = z$$

Apply permutation $\sigma$ to profile $u$. From A, N, and (A.7), we obtain

$$F \begin{pmatrix} a & b & 1-a-b \\ z & x & y \\ x & y & z \\ y & z & x \end{pmatrix} = y$$

1.2.1 Suppose $1-a-b > b$
Then, analogues to case I.1, some $y$-voters in $u_\cdot$ can pretend to have rankings $z$ and $x$ so as to attain the profile in (A.8). Since this leads to outcome $y$, which they prefer to $z$, this contradicts SP. We conclude that case I.2.1 is impossible. Hence,

I.2.2 $1 - a - b < b$

Apply permutation $\sigma^{-1}$ to profile $u_\cdot$. From (A), (N), and (A.7), we have

$$
\begin{bmatrix}
a & b & 1-a-b \\
y & z & x \\
z & x & y \\
x & y & z
\end{bmatrix} = x
$$

Because $a > b$ and $1-a-b < b$, $y$-voters in $u_\cdot$ can attain the profile (A.9) by manipulating, a violation of SP. We conclude that case I.2 is impossible, and, therefore, that Case I is impossible.

Case II: Suppose that $z$ beats $y$ according to the Borda count.

Then because $x$ beats $z$, we have $2a + 1 - a - b > 2(1 - a - b) + b > 2b + a$,

and so

$$
\begin{align*}
A.10 & \quad a > \frac{1}{3} > b & \quad \frac{2}{3} > a + b
\end{align*}
$$

II.1 Suppose that $F(u_\cdot, Y) = z$, i.e.,

$$
\begin{bmatrix}
a & b & 1-a-b \\
x & y & z \\
y & z & x \\
z & x & y
\end{bmatrix} = z
$$

Apply $\sigma$ to profile $u_\cdot$. From A, N, and (A.11) we have
(A.12) \[
\begin{pmatrix}
  a & b & 1-a-b \\
  z & x & y \\
  x & y & z \\
  y & z & x \\
\end{pmatrix} = y
\]

II.1.1 Suppose \( a > 1-a-b \)

Then from (A.10), \( 1-a-b > b \) and so \( y \)-voters in (A.11) can pretend to have rankings

\[
\begin{pmatrix}
  y & z & x \\
  z & x & y \\
\end{pmatrix}
\]

so as to obtain profile (A.12), a contradiction of SP. Hence,

II.1.2 \( a < 1-a-b \)

II.1.2.1 Suppose

(A.13) \[
\begin{pmatrix}
  a & 1-2a & a \\
  x & y & z \\
  y & z & x \\
  z & x & y \\
\end{pmatrix} = x
\]

Then from \( 1-a-b > a \), (A.11) and (A.13), some \( y \)-voters in profile (A.13) are better off pretending to be \( z \)-voters so as to generate profile (A.11), a contradiction of SP.

Hence case II.1.2.1 is impossible

II.1.2.2 Suppose

(A.14) \[
\begin{pmatrix}
  a & 1-2a & a \\
  x & y & z \\
  y & z & x \\
  z & x & y \\
\end{pmatrix} = y
\]

Apply \( \sigma \) to profile (A.14). From A and N, we have
From (A.15), $y$-voters in profile (A.14) can pretend to have ranking $\frac{y}{z}$ and thus improve their outcome from $y$ to $x$, a contradiction of SP. Hence case II.1.2.2 is impossible. We are left with II.1.2.3

$$
(A.16) \quad F \begin{pmatrix} a & \frac{1-2a}{a} & a \\ z & x & y \\ x & y & z \\ y & z & x \\ z & x & y \end{pmatrix} = z
$$

Apply $\sigma$ to the profile in (A.16). From A and N, we have

$$
(A.17) \quad F \begin{pmatrix} a & \frac{1-2a}{a} & a \\ z & x & y \\ x & y & z \\ y & z & x \end{pmatrix} = y
$$

From (A.17), $y$-voters in profile (A.16) can pretend to have ranking $\frac{y}{z}$ and thus improve their outcome from $z$ to $y$, a contradiction of SP. We conclude that Case II.1 is impossible.

II.2

$$
(A.18) \quad F \begin{pmatrix} a & b & 1-a-b \\ x & y & z \\ y & z & x \\ z & x & y \end{pmatrix} = y
$$

Apply $\sigma$ to the profile in (A.18). From A and N, we have
\[
\begin{pmatrix}
a & b & 1-a-b \\
z & x & y \\
x & y & z \\
y & z & x \\
\end{pmatrix} = x
\]

(A.19)

II.2.1 Suppose \(a > 1 - a - b\)

Then, because \(1 - a - b > b\), (A.19) implies that \(x\)-votes in (A.18) can pretend to have rankings \(y\) and \(z\) and induce profile (A.19), which improves the outcome from \(y\) to \(x\), contradicting SP.

Hence

II.2.2 \(a < 1 - a - b\)

If

\[
\begin{pmatrix}
a & 1-2a & a \\
x & y & z \\
y & z & x \\
z & x & y \\
\end{pmatrix} = x \text{ or } z
\]

(A.20)

then \(y\)-voters in profile (A.20) can pretend to have ranking \(z\) and, from (A.18), improve their outcome to \(y\), contradicting SP. Hence,

\[
\begin{pmatrix}
a & 1-2a & a \\
x & y & z \\
y & z & x \\
z & x & y \\
\end{pmatrix} = y
\]

(A.21)

Apply \(\sigma\) to (A.21), and we obtain, from A and N,
From (A.22), $y$-voters in (A.21) can pretend to have ranking $y$ and improve the outcome from $y$ to $x$, violating SP. Hence case II is impossible and step 1 is completed.

**Step 2:** We next show that there exists no voting rule satisfying A, N, D, and SP on any expansion of $U^{CC}$.

From symmetry, consider

$$U^* = \begin{cases} x, y, z, x \\ y, z, x, z \\ z, x, y, y \end{cases}$$

Suppose to the contrary $F$ satisfies the axioms on $U^*$

For small $d > 0$, we have

\[
(A.23) \quad F \begin{pmatrix} \frac{1}{3} - d & \frac{1}{3} + 2d & \frac{1}{3} - d \\ x & y & z \\ y & z & x \\ z & x & y \end{pmatrix} = y
\]

because, from step 1, $F = F^B$ on $U^{CC}$ and $y$ is the Borda winner for the profile in (A.23) Suppose, first, that we have
Case 1:

\[
F \left( \frac{1 - d}{3} \frac{1 + 2d}{3} \frac{1 - d}{3} \right) = x \\
\begin{pmatrix}
  x & y & x \\
  z & z & z \\
  y & x & y
\end{pmatrix}
\]

But then \( x \) - and \( z \) -voters in profile (A.23) are better off pretending to have ranking \( x \) and \( z \) improving the outcome from \( y \) to \( x \), a contradiction of SP. Next, suppose

Case II:

\[
F \left( \frac{1 - d}{3} \frac{1 + 2d}{3} \frac{1 - d}{3} \right) = y, \text{ i.e. (from A),}
\]

\[
\begin{pmatrix}
  x & y & x \\
  z & z & z \\
  y & x & y
\end{pmatrix}
\]

\[
(A.24) \quad F \left( \frac{2 - 2d}{3} \frac{1 + 2d}{3} \right) = y
\]

From the permutation \( \sigma^* \) with \( \sigma^*(x) = y, \ \sigma^*(y) = x, \ \sigma^*(z) = z \), A and N, (A.24) implies

\[
(A.25) \quad F \left( \frac{2 - 2d}{3} \frac{1 + 2d}{3} \right) = x
\]
But voters in (A.25) can pretend to have ranking \( x \) and induce (A.24), improving the outcome from \( x \) to \( y \) and thereby violating SP. We conclude that we must have

**Case III:**

\[
\begin{pmatrix}
\frac{1}{3} - d & \frac{1}{3} + 2d & \frac{1}{3} - d \\
1 & 2 & 1 \\
3 & 2 & 3
\end{pmatrix} z
\]

(A.26) \[ F \]

From (A.26) and A, we have

\[
\begin{pmatrix}
\frac{2}{3} - 2d & \frac{1}{3} + 2d \\
1 & 2 & 1 \\
3 & 2 & 3
\end{pmatrix} z
\]

(A.27) \[ F \]

otherwise \( x \)-voters in (A.27) are better off pretending to have ranking \( y \) and inducing (A.26), a violation of SP. Let \( \sigma^{**} \) be the permutation for which \( \sigma^{**}(x) = z \quad \sigma^{**}(y) = y \quad \sigma^{**}(z) = x \). Then from (A.27) A, and N

\[
\begin{pmatrix}
\frac{2}{3} - 2d & \frac{1}{3} + 2d \\
1 & 2 & 1 \\
3 & 2 & 3
\end{pmatrix} x
\]

(A.28) \[ F \]

But \( y \)-voters in (A.28) can pretend to have ranking \( z \) and induce profile (A.27) and outcome \( z \), a violation of SP. So case III is also impossible, and step 2 is complete.
Step 3: Finally, we show that any voting rule satisfying A, N, D, and SP on a rich domain without a Condorcet cycle must be majority rule.

There are three such rich domains:

Case I: \( U^I = \{ x, y, z, x, y \} \) (single-peaked preferences)

Suppose \( F \) satisfies the axioms on \( U^I \) but \( F \neq F^C \) on that domain. Then there exists profile

\[
u'_i = \begin{pmatrix} a & b & c & 1-a-b-c \\ x & y & y & z \\ y & z & x & y \\ z & x & z & x \end{pmatrix}
\]

such that \( F^C(u'_i, \{ x, y, z \}) \neq F(u'_i, \{ x, y, z \}) \)

1.1. \( F^C(u'_i, \{ x, y, z \}) = x \), and so \( a > \frac{1}{2} \)

1.1.1. Suppose

(A.29) \( F(u'_i, \{ x, y, z \}) = y \)

If

(A.30) \( F \begin{pmatrix} a & 1-a \\ x & y \\ y & x \\ z & z \end{pmatrix} = x \) or \( z \)

then from (A.29), \( y \) -voters in profile (A.30) are better off pretending to have rankings \( y \) and \( z \) and \( x \) so as to induce profile \( u'_i \) and outcome \( y \), a violation of SP. Hence, we have \( y \)
Consider permutation \( \sigma^* \) with \( \sigma^*(x) = y, \ \sigma^*(y) = x, \ \sigma^*(z) = z \). Then, from A, N and (A.31)

\[
(F(a, 1-a), (x, y, z)) = y
\]

From (A.31) and (A.32) and because \( a > \frac{1}{2} \), \( x \)-voters in (A.31) are better off pretending to have

\[
y \quad z
\]

so as to induce profile (A.32) and outcome \( x \), violating SP. Hence Case I.1.1 is impossible. We next consider

I.1.2

\[
(F(u'_i, (x, y, z)) = z
\]

If

\[
(F(a, 1-a), (x, z, y, y, z)) = x \text{ or } y
\]

then \( y \)-voters in profile (A.34) are better off pretending to have rankings \( (x, z, y) \) and \( (y, x, z) \) so as to

induce profile \( u'_i \) and outcome \( z \), a violation of SP. Hence,
Apply permutation $\sigma^{**}$ (with $\sigma^{**}(x) = z$, $\sigma^{**}(z) = x$, and $\sigma^{**}(y) = y$) to (A.35).

Then, from A and N,

$$F \begin{pmatrix} a & 1-a \\ x & z \\ y & y \\ z & x \end{pmatrix} = x \tag{A.36}$$

From (A.35) and (A.36) and because $a > \frac{1}{2}$, $\frac{x}{z}$ voters in (A.35) are better off pretending to have $\frac{z}{x}$ ranking so as to induce profile (A.36) and outcome $x$, violating SP. Hence, case I.1 is impossible. We next consider

1.2 $F^c(u^l_i, \{x, y, z\}) = y$ and so $a < \frac{1}{2}$ and $a + b + c > \frac{1}{2}$

1.2.1 Suppose

$$F(u^l_i, \{x, y, z\}) = x \tag{A.37}$$

If

$$F \begin{pmatrix} a & b+c & 1-a-b-c \\ x & y & z \\ y & x & y \\ z & z & x \end{pmatrix} = y, \tag{A.38}$$
then \( y \) - voters in (A.37) will pretend to have ranking \( y, x, z \) so as to induce profile (A.38) and outcome \( y \), a violation of SP. If

\[
\begin{pmatrix}
  a & b + c & 1 - a - b - c \\
  x & y & z \\
  y & x & y \\
  z & z & x
\end{pmatrix}

= z,
\]

then \( x \)-voters in profile (A.39) will pretend to have ranking \( y, z, x \) so as to induce profile \( u \) and outcome \( x \), a violation of SP. Hence,

\[
\begin{pmatrix}
  a & b + c & 1 - a - b - c \\
  x & y & z \\
  y & x & y \\
  z & z & x
\end{pmatrix}

= x
\]

If

\[
\begin{pmatrix}
  a & 1 - a \\
  x & y \\
  y & x \\
  z & z
\end{pmatrix}

= y,
\]

then \( y \) - voters in (A.40) will pretend to have ranking \( y, x, z \) so as to induce profile (A.41), contradicting SP. If

\[
\begin{pmatrix}
  a & 1 - a \\
  x & y \\
  y & x \\
  z & z
\end{pmatrix}

= z,
\]
then $x$ -voters in (A.42) will pretend to have ranking $y$ so as to induce profile (A.40) and outcome $x$, contradicting SP. Thus,

$$
(A.43) \quad F \begin{pmatrix}
\begin{array}{cc}
a & 1-a \\
x & y \\
y & x \\
z & z \\
\end{array}
\end{pmatrix} = x
$$

Apply permutation $\sigma^*$ with $\sigma^*(x) = y$, $\sigma^*(y) = x$, $\sigma^*(z) = z$ to (A.43). Then, from A and N

$$
(A.44) \quad F \begin{pmatrix}
\begin{array}{cc}
a & 1-a \\
y & x \\
x & y \\
z & z \\
\end{array}
\end{pmatrix} = y
$$

Because $1 - a > \frac{1}{2}$, $x$ -voters in (A.43) gain from pretending to have ranking $y$ so as to induce profile (A.44) and outcome $y$, contradicting SP. Hence Case I.2.1 is impossible.

By symmetry between $x$ and $z$, it is also impossible to have $F(u', \{x, y, z\}) = z$. Hence, Case I.2 is impossible, which leaves

$I.3 \quad F^C(u', \{x, y, z\}) = z$

But by the symmetry between $x$ and $z$, this subcase is ruled out by the impossibility of Case I.1.

So we turn to

Case II:

$$
U'' = \left\{ \begin{array}{c}
\begin{array}{ccc}
x & y & y \\
y & z & x \\
z & x & z \\
\end{array}
\end{array} \right\}
$$

Suppose $F$ satisfies the axioms on $U''$ but $F \neq F^C$. Consider
such that $F^C(u^*,\{x, y, z\}) \neq F(u^*,\{x, y, z\})$. Notice that $z$ is Pareto-dominated by $y$, and so we can’t have $F(u^*,\{x, y, z\}) = z$ or $F^C(u^*,\{x, y, z\}) = z$.

II.1 Suppose

$$\begin{pmatrix} a & b & 1-a-b \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} x & y & y \\ y & z & x \\ z & x & z \end{pmatrix} = x,$$

and so $a > \frac{1}{2}$

Hence

$$\begin{pmatrix} a & b & 1-a-b \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} x & y & y \\ y & z & x \\ z & x & z \end{pmatrix} = y$$

From (A.46) we have

$$\begin{pmatrix} a & 1-a \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} x & y \\ y & x \\ z & z \end{pmatrix} = y,$$

otherwise $x$-voters in (A.47) would pretend to have ranking $\begin{pmatrix} y & z \end{pmatrix}$ so as to induce profile (A.46) and better outcome $y$. Apply permutation $\sigma^*$ (with $\sigma^*(x) = y$, $\sigma^*(y) = x$, $\sigma^*(z) = z$) to profile (A.47). From A and N, we obtain
(A.48) \[ F \begin{pmatrix} a & 1-a \\ y & x \\ x & y \\ z & z \end{pmatrix} = x. \]

But some \( x \)-voters in (A.48) are better off pretending to have ranking \( y \) so as to induce profile (A.47) and better outcome \( y \), a contradiction of SP. Thus case II.1 is impossible. We have

II.2

(A.49) \[ F^C \begin{pmatrix} a & b & 1-a-b \\ x & y & y \\ y & z & x \\ z & x & z \end{pmatrix} = y \text{ and so } a < \frac{1}{2} \]

and

(A.50) \[ F \begin{pmatrix} a & b & 1-a-b \\ x & y & y \\ y & z & x \\ z & x & z \end{pmatrix} = x \]

From (A.50)

(A.51) \[ F \begin{pmatrix} a & 1-a \\ x & y \\ y & x \\ z & z \end{pmatrix} = x, \]

otherwise \( z \)-voters in (A.50) would pretend to have ranking \( y \) so as to induce profile (A.51) and a more favorable outcome. But (A.51) leads to the same contradictions as in case II.1. We conclude that case II is impossible.
Case III:

\[
U^{III} = \begin{bmatrix}
x & x & y & y \\
y, z, z, x \\
z, y, x, z
\end{bmatrix}
\]

Suppose \( F \) satisfies the axioms on \( U^{III} \) but \( F \neq F^C \).

Then, there exists profile

\[
u^{III} = \begin{bmatrix}
a & b & c \\
x & x & y \\
y, z, z, x \\
z, y, x, z
\end{bmatrix}
\]

for which \( F(u^{III}, \{x, y, z\}) \neq F^C(u^{III}, \{x, y, z\}) \). Notice that \( z \) can never be a Condorcet winner.

Hence assume without loss of generality that

\[
(A.52) \quad F^C(u^{III}, \{x, y, z\}) = x \quad \text{and so} \quad a + b > 1 - a - b
\]

III.1 Suppose

\[
(A.53) \quad F \left( \begin{bmatrix}
a & b & c & 1-a-b-c \\
x & x & y & y \\
y, z, z, x \\
z, y, x, z
\end{bmatrix} \right) = y
\]

If

\[
(A.54) \quad F \left( \begin{bmatrix}
\frac{a+b}{c} & 1-a-b-c \\
x & y & y \\
y, z, x \\
z, x, z
\end{bmatrix} \right) = x
\]

then \( x \)-voters in profile (A.53) will pretend to have ranking \( y \) in order to induce (A.54) and a better outcome \( x \). If
\[(A.55) \quad F \left( \frac{a+b}{c} \frac{1-a-b-c}{y} \right) = z \]

then some \(x\)-voters in (A.55) will pretend to have ranking \(x\) \(z\) in order to induce (A.53) and better outcome \(y\). Hence

\[(A.56) \quad F \left( \frac{a+b}{c} \frac{1-a-b-c}{y} \right) = y \]

Furthermore,

\[(A.57) \quad F \left( \frac{a+b}{y} \frac{1-a-b}{z} \right) = y, \]

otherwise some \(y\)-voters in (A.57) will pretend to have ranking \(y\) \(z\) and induce (A.56) leading to better outcome \(y\). But applying \(\sigma^*\) (with \(\sigma^*(x) = y, \ \sigma^*(y) = x, \ \sigma^*(z) = z\)) to profile (A.57) and then invoking A and N, we obtain

\[(A.58) \quad F \left( \frac{a+b}{y} \frac{1-a-b}{x} \right) = x, \]

and so \(x\)-voters in (A.58) have the incentive to induce profile (A.57). Hence, Case III.1 is impossible. We are left with
III.2

\[(A.59) \begin{pmatrix} a & b & c & 1-a-b-c \\ x & x & y & y \\ y & z & z & x \\ z & y & x & z \end{pmatrix} = z \]

If

\[(A.60) \begin{pmatrix} a+b & c & 1-a-b-c \\ x & y & y \\ y & z & x \\ z & x & z \end{pmatrix} = x, \]

then $x$ -voters in (A.59) will induce (A.60), a contradiction of SP.

If

\[(A.61) \begin{pmatrix} a+b & c & 1-a-b-c \\ x & y & y \\ y & z & x \\ z & x & z \end{pmatrix} = y, \]

then we obtain the same contradiction as with (A.56).

Hence,

\[(A.62) \begin{pmatrix} a+b & c & 1-a-b-c \\ x & y & y \\ y & z & x \\ z & x & z \end{pmatrix} = z \]

But, from P,

\[(A.63) \begin{pmatrix} a+c & 1-a-c \\ y & y \\ z & x \\ x & z \end{pmatrix} = y \]
Thus, \(x\)-voters in profile (A.62) can gain by pretending to have rankings \(y\) and \(z\) and \(x\) and \(z\) inducing profile (A.63). We conclude Case III is impossible. Q.E.D.