WORK IN PROGRESS:

WORKING DISSERTATION TITLE:

FIELDS OF CONCENTRATION:

DESIRED RESEARCH AND TEACHING FIELDS:

PRIMARY
Labor Economics
Public Economics

SECONDARY
Personnel Economics

BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION:

NINA ROUSSILLE
nina_roussille@berkeley.edu
https://ninaroussille.github.io/

BUSINESS ADDRESS:
Department of Economics
530 Evans Hall, #3880
Berkeley, CA 94720-3880

DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY

PLACEMENT SERVICE: Janene Martinez
place@econ.berkeley.edu

WORKING PAPERS:

• The Central Role Of The Ask Gap In Gender Pay Inequality (JMP)
  Abstract: The gender ask gap measures the extent to which women ask for lower salaries than comparable men. This paper studies the role of the ask gap in generating wage inequality, using novel data from Hired.com, an online recruitment platform for full-time engineering jobs in the United States. To use the platform, job candidates must post an ask salary, stating how much they want to make in their next job. Firms then apply to candidates by offering them a bid salary, solely based on the candidate's resume and ask salary. If the candidate is hired, a final salary is recorded. After adjusting for resume characteristics, the ask gap is 3.3%, the gap in bid salaries is 2.4%, and the gap in final offers is 1.8%. Remarkably, more controlling for the ask salary explains the entirety of the residual gender gaps in bid and final salaries. To estimate the market-level effects of an increase in women's ask salaries, I exploit an unexpected change in how candidates were prompted to provide their ask. For some candidates in mid-2018, the answer box used to solicit the ask salary was changed from an empty field to an entry pre-filled with the median bid salary for similar candidates. Using an interrupted time series design, I find that this change drove the ask gap and the bid gap to zero. In addition, women did not receive fewer bids than men did due to the change, suggesting they faced little penalty for demanding wages comparable to men.

• Tax Evasion and the Swiss Cheese Regulation
  Abstract: Before automatic exchange of information, the 2005 Savings Tax Directive was the most far-ranging initiative in the attempt to curb tax evasion of European households in Switzerland. Under this program, European tax evaders holding interest-yielding accounts in Switzerland had two choices: either declare their accounts to the fiscal authorities of their resident countries or pay a tax upfront and keep their anonymity. Exploiting a unique combination of public administrative datasets, this paper sheds light on the loopholes of this reform and the large behavioral responses of tax evaders aimed at exploiting them. I find that the reform barely curbed tax evasion: 80% of the European offshore wealth in Switzerland remained both undeclared and untaxed by 2013. Using the Swiss households’ investments as a control group, I show that the failure of the Directive is mainly explained by tax evaders’ active re-investment strategies in tax-exempt assets. While they remain fairly low, declarations of offshore wealth under the Directive have more than quadrupled over the period 2006-2013. This paper demonstrates that monetary incentives, such as tax amnesty offers in the evader’s home country or the increase in the upfront tax in Switzerland, are the first drivers of declarations. Conversely, bilateral information exchange treaties that were praised as a way to “end bank secrecy” have the least effect on declarations.

WORK IN PROGRESS:

• Biased Beliefs about Outside Options and Wage Inequality (with Simon Jäger, Benjamin Schoefer and Christopher Roth)
  Abstract: In this paper, we designed a survey, added to the Innovation Sample of the German Socio-Economic Panel, to examine how workers’ beliefs about outside options job opportunities in other firms affect their labor market behavior, specifically wage negotiations and mobility. Standard labor market models assume that workers and firms have full information about those outside options. This assumption is crucial yet untested. Our goal is to ask whether this type of friction can help explain the puzzling rise in wage dispersion, which is largely accounted for by increased divergence in firm-level wage policies. Drawing on a representative sample of the German population, we first measure respondents’ beliefs about their outside options at other firms. We then provide a random subset of our respondents with information about wages paid to comparable workers at other firms. Using a unique combination of survey and administrative data, we then study how this information provision affects our respondents’ on-the-job-search, their future wages, their likelihood of switching jobs, as well as their labor supply.
• The Effect of Gender and Racial Team Composition on Career Trajectories (with Elizabeth Linos and Sanaz Mobasseri)
  
  Abstract: This paper estimates the causal impact of gender and racial team composition on career trajectories of minorities, leveraging the quasi-random assignment to projects of more than 10,000 new hires at a large multinational in the professional services sector. Our granular data on staffing decisions allows us to track the projects people work on and who their teammates and managers are; while the combination of HR administrative records and personnel surveys provides detailed information on career outcomes. The analysis of early team composition supports a story of path dependence: early exposure to more white employees significantly predicts higher turnover and lower promotion for Black employees, and Black women in particular. We hypothesize that these effects are driven by barriers to forming bonds with co-workers of different races and genders. We are currently collecting engagement survey data as well as network data at the firm to test for this hypothesis.

• Revealed Preference Job Ladders (with Benjamin Scuderi)
  
  Abstract: This paper develops a new approach to understanding heterogeneity among workers’ rankings of firm. To do so, we exploit a novel dataset from the online recruitment platform, Hired.com. On this platform, firms apply to candidates and we therefore observe each candidate’s menu of firm choices as well as their decision to accept or reject the interview request from firms. This decision reveals candidates’ partial ordering over firms, which we use to infer global rankings over firms on the platform. Using this data, we first assess the goodness of fit of a single ordering model. Then we develop a non-parametric approach that allows us to assess the extent of heterogeneity necessary to rationalize the observed choices. Finally, the rich set of observables we have on both candidates (gender, resume information and salary expectations) and companies (firm size, industry and candidate-specific salary offers) allows us to understand which firm characteristics correlate with individual rankings as well as explore the individual characteristics that drive heterogeneity in rankings.

SEMINARS AND CONFERENCES:
  
  2021  ASSA Annual Meetings, Discrimination and Fairness session (scheduled)
  2016  Paris School of Economics Applied Economics Seminar

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE:

RESEARCH:
• UC Berkeley : Research assistant to Prof. Gabriel Zucman (Fall 2019 and Fall 2020), Prof. David Card and Prof. Patrick Kline (Fall 2018), Prof. Benjamin Schoefer (Summer and Fall 2017)
• Harvard University : Research assistant to Prof. Raj Chetty and Prof. Stefanie Stantcheva at the Lab for Economic Applications and Policy, 2015-2016
• OECD : Research internship, Summer 2014

TEACHING:
  
  Teaching Assistant, Department of Economics, UC Berkeley:
• Econ 133: Global Inequality and Growth, UC Berkeley, Spring 2019 and Spring 2020
• Econ 140: Economic statistics and Econometrics, UC Berkeley, Fall 2018

REFEREERING:
  
  American Economic Review

OTHER:
  
  President of Economists for Equity at Berkeley (2018-2019) and currently Head of Professional Development there.

FELLOWSHIPS AND AWARDS:
  
  2020 Outstanding Graduate Student Instructor Award (awarded to top 10% of GSIs), Institute for Research on Labor and Employment Dissertation Fellowship
  2019 George Break Prize in Public Finance (awarded for outstanding performance in public finance field courses) + UC Berkeley Opportunity Lab, Labor science Grant
  2018 UC Berkeley Economics Department Fellowship
  2017 Burch Center Fellowship
  2016 UC Berkeley Economics Department Fellowship + Dean Summer Research Grant

OTHER INFORMATION:
  
  Programming: Python, Stata
  Languages: English (fluent), French (Native)
  Citizenship: French