

Mathilde Muñoz

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BUSINESS ADDRESS

Paris School of Economics,
48 Boulevard Jourdan
75014 PARIS

PERSONAL INFORMATION

Citizenship: French
Born in 1995
Gender: Female

RESEARCH AND TEACHING FIELDS

PRIMARY: Public Economics

SECONDARY: International trade, labor economics

REFERENCES

Professor Thomas Piketty
Paris School of Economics
piketty@psemail.eu

Professor Stefanie Stantcheva
Harvard University
sstantcheva@fas.harvard.edu

Professor Camille Landais
London School of Economics
c.landais@lse.ac.uk

Professor Arnaud Costinot
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
costinot@mit.edu

DOCTORAL STUDIES

Paris School of Economics, PhD

DISSERTATION TITLE: "Essays on International Labor Mobility and Redistribution"

Advisor: Professor Thomas Piketty

Expected date of completion: June 2022

Harvard University

Arthur Sachs Visiting Fellow

2021-2022

Sponsor: Professor Stefanie Stantcheva

London School of Economics

European Doctoral Program Visiting Student

2019-2020

Sponsor: Professor Camille Landais

PRE-DOCTORAL STUDIES

ENSAE-Ecole Polytechnique, MSc in Economics, *Summa Cum Laude*

2015-2017

ENS Cachan, BA Economics, High honors

2014-2018

PUBLICATIONS

Taxation and Migration: Evidence and Policy Implications, (with Henrik Kleven, Camille Landais and Stefanie Stantcheva), *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, Spring 2020 34(2): 119-142.

WORKING PAPERS

Trading Non-Tradables: The Implications of Europe's Job Posting Policy (JOB MARKET PAPER)

Abstract: Are local services jobs, such as plumbers or drivers, sheltered from globalization? Posting policies, that were first introduced in the European Union, allow firms in one country to send ("post") their workers to perform such

services in another country. I combine novel administrative data on posting missions in Europe, quasi-experimental variations in the policy, and a model of trade in services, to evaluate the redistributive implications of exposing novel jobs to international competition. I show that the staggered liberalization of posting to low wage countries permanently increased trade in services in Europe: 2% of EU GDP is offshored “on-site” through posting, mostly in “non-tradable” sectors, while within-EU geographic mobility is twice as large once accounting for posted workers. In receiving countries, domestic employment in exposed sectors and local labor markets decreased following the liberalization. These market-level displacement effects are driven by posted workers being substitutes rather than complements for domestic workers at receiving firms, and posting services being cheaper. I then demonstrate that posting openness triggered large economic gains in low-wage sending countries: firms in formerly “non-tradable” sectors increase their sales, profits and wages when accessing foreign markets through posting. Calibrating a model of trade in services with estimates of the posting elasticity, I finally quantify that the liberalization increased European consumers’ welfare by 0.3% on average. My results suggest that expanding the range of tradable jobs through posting policies, as proposed in several major recent trade agreements, hurts low-paid workers in high wage countries, benefits sending firms in low wage countries, and has small efficiency effects for consumers.

Do European Top Earners Respond to Taxation Through Migration? (IIPF Young Economist Award 2019)

Abstract: This paper studies the effects of top income tax rates on top earners’ migration, using a novel individual dataset on mobility representative of the entire population of 21 European countries. I exploit the differential effects of changes in top tax rates on individuals at different earnings levels. Top earners’ location choices are significantly affected by top income tax rates. The elasticity of the number of top earners with respect to the net-of-tax rate is between 0.1 and 0.3; it is above one for foreigners. Migration elasticities differ widely across member states, leading to different incentives to implement beggar-thy-neighbour tax policies within Europe.

How Much Are the Poor Losing From Tax Competition? A Welfare Analysis of Fiscal Dumping in Europe

Abstract: This paper quantifies the welfare effects of tax competition in an union where individuals can respond to taxation through migration. I derive the optimal linear and non-linear tax and transfer schedules in a free mobility union composed by symmetric countries that can either compete or set a federal tax rate. I use empirical earnings’ distribution and estimated migration elasticities to implement numerical calibrations and simulations. I show that even when migration elasticities are small, the bottom fifty percent always loses from tax competition. Being in a competition union rather in a federal union could decrease poorer individuals welfare up to -20 percent.

WORK IN PROGRESS

Wealth Tax and Information Disclosure Requirements, joint with Bertrand Garbinti, Jonathan Goupille-Lebret, Stefanie Stantcheva and Gabriel Zucman

Abstract: Using exhaustive administrative wealth tax returns in France, we show that taxpayers do not respond to changes in wealth tax rates but strongly react to opportunities to hide information on the type of wealth they own. Combining a set of reforms that dramatically changed wealth information disclosure requirements with both dynamic bunching and difference-in-differences approaches, we estimate behavioral responses to information discontinuities in the wealth tax schedule. Implementing low information options in wealth tax returns causally decreased declared wealth growth rate by 0.4 percentage points each year on average, and by 4 percentage points for those taking-up the opportunity to hide wealth information after the reform. We build a theoretical framework that rationalizes the observed differences between individuals who self-select into the low-information option.

Persistent Labor Market Impact of Exposure to Temporary Migration, joint with Nina Roussille

Abstract: How does temporary exposure to foreign work conditions affect domestic workers’ bargaining power and long-term labor market outcomes? We combine the unique setting provided by the European posting policy with novel longitudinal data on the career of Belgian workers exposed to temporary migration events to answer this question.

FELLOWSHIPS AND AWARDS

- **Harvard University**
Arthur Sachs fellowship *June 2021-June 2022*
- **European Commission**
Principal Investigator for POSTING.STAT Project (VP/2020/007) *January 2021-July 2022*
- **EUR PGSE**
Research Funds *June 2020 & November 2020*
- **OECD**
Future of Work Fellowship *January 2020- December 2020*

- **International Institute of Public Finance**
Young Economist Award *August 2019*
 - **European Doctoral Program in Quantitative Economics**
EDP Visiting Grant *September 2019 – July 2020*
 - **Paris School of Economics**
International Mobility Grant *September 2019 – July 2020*
 - **French Ministry of Research**
Full Doctoral Fellowship *September 2018 – August 2021*
 - **École Normale Supérieure de Cachan**
Full Fellowship *September 2014 – August 2018*
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EXTERNAL SEMINARS AND CONFERENCES

- 2021: CREST applied seminar, ZEW research seminar, CESIFO Public Economics conference, UEEA Conference, GEP/CEPR Globalization conference, ERBD/King's College Migration Workshop, LISER Research Seminar, Harvard Graduate Labor Seminar.
 - 2020: LSE public lunch seminar, ENS Lyon Applied Seminar, OECD Future of Work Conference, OECD/CEPII Migration Conference.
 - 2019: Paris Workshop in Taxation Economics, IIPF Congress, ECINEQ Conference.
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REFEREEING AND OTHER SERVICES

- Referee for: AEJ Applied, AEJ Economic Policy.
 - Audited for: French ministry of labor report on posted workers, Commission for European coordination on social security system.
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RESEARCH EXPERIENCE

London School of Economics 2017-2018
Pre-Doctoral Research Assistant to Professor Camille Landais and Professor Johannes Spinnewijn

TEACHING

London School of Economics Fall 2019
Teaching Fellow, Graduate Public Economics

Sciences Po Paris Fall 2018
Teaching Assistant, Information and Mechanism Design