Browse past events, seminars, and conferences.
The Political Economy of Public Health Insurance Contracts: New Theory and an Empirical Puzzle
"Calibeating": Beating Forecasters at Their Own Game
Randomization and the Robustness of Linear Contracts
Bidder Recruitment in Auctions with Frictions
Learning preferences
Persuasion with Ambiguous Communication
Divide or Confer: Aggregating Information without Verification
Non-Discriminatory Personalized Pricing
A Theory of Choice Overload
Shill-Proof Auctions
Procedural Choice under Risk
Cost over Content: Information Choice in Trade
Undominated Mechanisms
Informed communication equilibrium
Robustly Optimal Income Taxation
Equilibrium in Pseudomarkets
Robust Regulation of Labour Contracts
News Media as Suppliers of Narratives (and Information)
Optimal Auction Design for Dynamic Stochastic Environments: Myerson Meets Naor
Distributional Ambiguity and Misspecification